d7c0a5521d0effa56599a26c2da36f213dbb9725
160 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 funman300
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d7c0a5521d |
switch: refuse to arm at a dead target; watchdog: use a pidfile
Three times now the same sequence has broken the client path: a build guard correctly refuses to start the Rust replacement, and the `switch on` that follows in the same script arms anyway, because it never checked whether anything was listening. The redirect then lands on a closed socket and the working Python service is bypassed for no benefit. `on` now refuses unless the target port is listening. ALLOW_DEAD_TARGET=1 overrides it for arming ahead of a service that is about to start, but that has to be deliberate. Verified both ways: rc=2 and nothing installed against a dead port, rc=0 and two rules with the override. The watchdog now writes a pidfile. Stopping it by command-line match is unsafe -- any shell whose arguments merely mention the script name matches too, which has now killed the wrong process twice here (once via `pkill -f`, once via a /proc/*/cmdline substring loop). |
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funman300
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2ae90b1ea9 |
tooling: watchdog that rolls an armed switch back when the service stops answering
`openfut-switch.sh on` prints "the service MUST stay up" -- true, and useless when nobody is at the terminal. An armed switch pointing at a dead port means the client hits a closed socket with no fallback. This turns the documented rollback into an automatic one, failing toward the Python oracle. The worst case of a spurious trip is a gate needing re-arming; it can never leave the client broken. It only ever REMOVES a switch. It does not install one, restart the Rust service, or touch Python, and it does not re-arm after tripping -- an unexplained rollback should be a finding to read, not something hidden by flapping the switch back on. The probe goes through the switch and speaks TLS, because a bare TCP connect would succeed against a process wedged mid-handshake. Tested both directions, not just the happy path: quiet for 45s against a healthy service, and against a stopped one it failed 3/3 in 9s, rolled back, and left Python serving -- verified by re-reading all four tables and by which implementation's log grew. |
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funman300
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cfb0435d96 |
redirector.sh: verify the RUNNING process's commit, not just the binary on disk
`verify` inspects `$BIN --identity`, which is the file on disk. That is not necessarily what is serving. Caught during gate 14 setup: the live process had been started from |
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funman300
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fc411bb6f1 |
scripts: require one certificate across the whole FIFA-facing TLS stack
Two live gates were lost to a second variable I had been asked to eliminate. The Rust redirector was pointed at the repo's fifa17-recon/tools/redir_cert.pem (fingerprint F9:16:1A...), while the running container serves a different cert baked into its image (E7:F9:46...) which the Python redirector, roster and the rest of the stack all share. So the A/B compared TLS implementation AND certificate identity at once. FIFA 17's ProtoSSL caches the server certificate for a backend. The redirector is the first TLS connection of a session, so its cert becomes the one the client expects; the next service presenting a different cert fails its handshake. That is why the redirect itself always succeeded and the failure surfaced later, on the roster fetch -- "An error occurred downloading the FUT Squad Update". It stayed invisible because Python's socketserver swallows it: a handshake failure at accept() raises ssl.SSLError, which subclasses OSError and is discarded by _handle_request_noblock. No request log, no stderr. Every server looked healthy while the client could not talk to any of them. Confirmed on the wire: tls-observe in front of the roster server captured four ClientHellos from the client, correct SNI and the same 8 static-RSA suites it offers the redirector, none of which produced a request. The check is mutation-tested against the real bug: with a redirector started on the stale repo cert it exits 1 and names the mismatch. |
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funman300
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5bc39e902d |
tooling: observe client connection ATTEMPTS; make the build guard reject bad args
openfut-observe.sh answers the one question no server log can: when a gate fails and a service logged nothing, did the client try and fail, or never try? Both look like silence. Two redirector gates were lost to that ambiguity -- "roster server logged nothing" was equally consistent with a broken roster service, a wrong roster URL, and a client that never asked. Built on iptables packet counters because this box has no tcpdump, no conntrack, and no readable kernel log. That last one is verified rather than assumed: an initial LOG-based version installed correctly and its rules matched (counters proved it), but the output went nowhere -- journalctl -k has no entries and dmesg is empty. Counters are also lower volume and record only SYNs, so no payload can be captured even in principle. Validated against the live client, not a loopback stand-in: an initial self-test using this host's own address counted almost nothing, because locally-generated packets never traverse PREROUTING. Against the real remote client it counts 8081 at ~4/min, matching the roster server's own log. Known gap, recorded rather than hidden: the catch-all TOTAL runs well above the sum of the named ports, so the client makes steady background attempts to ports not tracked here. It is present during a working session, so it is not the failure signature, and it is not chased further here. verify-build-identity.sh now rejects an argument that is not a commit hash. Passing the binary path instead of its stamp previously produced a plausible "REFUSING: binary was built from ./target/release/... but HEAD is <sha>", which reads as a real stale-build finding rather than a caller mistake -- and a safeguard that cries wolf is one people learn to route around. Usage error is now exit 2, distinct from a genuine stale build (1) and success (0). |
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funman300
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e2c4ca6d56 |
redirector-host: reproduce the oracle's connection lifecycle, not just its bytes
Two live gate attempts failed with "An error occurred downloading the FUT
Squad Update" while the redirect response was verified byte-identical to the
Python oracle. Rolling back to the Python redirector fixed it, so the response
bytes were never the whole contract.
Log archaeology found the discriminator: the client polls
/fifa17/fut/rosterupdate.xml ~4x/min in every successful FUT session, and the
only gap in 300 recorded fetches is 03:47-03:58 -- exactly the two
Rust-redirector sessions. The Blaze RPC sequence over those sessions is
identical (msgNum 0-53), so the divergence is entirely outside Blaze.
A differential lifecycle probe against both redirectors found the two
behaviours this host never reproduced:
* the oracle drains the request body per Content-Length; this host stopped
at the header terminator, leaving unread data in the receive queue, which
makes Linux close with RST rather than FIN
* the oracle holds the connection open ~300ms before closing
(time.sleep(0.3)); this host closed at 0ms
Both are now reproduced. The dwell is a named constant, ORACLE_CLOSE_DWELL,
overridable only so the causal experiment -- set it to 0, confirm the failure
returns -- can be run without a rebuild.
The suite could not have caught either: it sent Content-Length: 0, so there
was never a body to drain. It now POSTs a body, and asserts a split-write body
is fully consumed.
Testing the drain via client-visible symptoms does NOT work -- verified by
mutation: with the drain removed the client still reads the buffered response
and sees close_notify before any reset. So the host records a per-connection
ConnOutcome and the test asserts on that. Both mutations (no-dwell, no-drain)
are now each caught by exactly one test.
This does not yet prove causation for the FUT Squad Update failure; it removes
the only two measured divergences. Gate 6 is the test.
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funman300
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288d990821 | empty commit to advance HEAD for the stale-binary mutation test | ||
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funman300
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c03702707b |
redirector: commit stamp + shared build-identity verifier that REFUSES
The binary records only the commit it was built from -- no dirty-tree flag. Cargo will not re-run a build script because another crate's source changed, so a compiled-in 'clean' claim can be stale and is not a safeguard; that was verified on the Blaze host. scripts/verify-build-identity.sh establishes both facts at LAUNCH, where they cannot go stale: the stamped commit equals HEAD, and the migration crates are clean. It REFUSES rather than warns, because for a migration gate a warning on stderr is something to scroll past. --identity prints the stamp without valid configuration. The launcher must be able to establish which commit a binary came from BEFORE deciding whether to run it; requiring a correct environment first would invert the check. redirector.sh mirrors sidecar.sh: refuses to start with an orphan present or the port busy, matches the resolved executable rather than the command line (pgrep -f matches any shell mentioning the name), and stop PROVES the process is gone and the port free. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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funman300
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89f77470f3 |
redirector: Rust host on vendored OpenSSL; shared typed config extracted
TLS DEPENDENCY, as directed: the openssl crate directly with the `vendored` feature. NOT native-tls. native-tls abstracts over whatever the platform provides; here the requirement is the opposite -- precise, evidenced behaviour for one legacy client -- which needs explicit control of the cipher list, protocol floor/ceiling and security level. Vendored so a distro libssl update cannot silently change whether FIFA 17 can connect. Scoped to this crate alone. Neither OpenFUT Core nor the generic protocol crates gain an OpenSSL dependency. CIPHERS driven by the captured retail ClientHello, not by generic legacy assumptions. The six RSA+AES suites it offers are enabled; RC4 and MD5 are deliberately NOT, even though the client offers them -- it already negotiates AES256-GCM-SHA384, so resurrecting RC4 for completeness would weaken the service for nothing. TLS 1.2 floor and ceiling, matching the observed client; the floor is not dropped to 1.0 pre-emptively because "the oracle permits it" is not "the client requires it". SECURITY LEVEL IS NOT LOWERED. Tried the default policy first, as directed, and OpenSSL 3.6.3 accepts static-RSA/AES without weakening. No SECLEVEL change was needed and none is applied; it remains overridable per-listener with evidence. CERTIFICATE: the proven Python redirector's material is reused, so the TLS implementation stays the only variable in an A/B. Verified RSA-2048, CN winter15.gosredirector.ea.com, cert/key modulus match; the key stays gitignored. SHARED CONFIG. New openfut-host-config is now the only crate that reads the environment, and both hosts resolve endpoints through it. Two hosts each parsing OPENFUT_ADVERTISE would be exactly the "separate helpers constructing endpoints from different sources of truth" the address audit forbids. VERIFICATION BY REAL HANDSHAKE, not by enumeration. The crate exposes no accessor for a context's configured suites at this version, which turned out better: the host now rehearses the retail handshake at startup with a client restricted to exactly FIFA's eight suites and REFUSES TO SERVE if it fails, so a cipher/version misconfiguration surfaces at boot rather than as an unexplained failure during a live gate. Gates 1-5 pass: TLS config unit tests; a FIFA-suite-only client negotiates TLSv1.2/AES256-GCM-SHA384; each enabled RSA+AES suite negotiable alone; an RC4-only client is refused; an ECDHE-only client is refused (proving no modern policy was silently inherited); a full HTTPS round-trip returns bytes IDENTICAL to the Python oracle's recorded response. Cargo.lock committed for reproducibility: openssl 0.10.81, openssl-sys 0.9.117, openssl-src 300.6.1+3.6.3 (OpenSSL 3.6.3). Updating openssl-src is NOT a routine bump -- it requires re-running the FIFA compatibility gates. Gates 6-14 need the retail client and are next. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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funman300
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0d576a14b7 |
switch: one generic NAT implementation; blaze-switch becomes a wrapper
The Blaze switch was hardwired to 42130 and could not intercept the redirector.
Rather than clone it, the iptables logic now lives in one place:
openfut-switch.sh generic: --server-ip --intercept-port --target-port
--name [--client-ip] [--legacy-tag]
blaze-switch.sh thin wrapper, CLI and output UNCHANGED so the validated
gate runbook and sidecar.sh's cross-check keep working
No deployment IP or port literal in the generic tool; 42130 is supplied by the
wrapper, 42127 by the redirector experiment.
VERIFICATION IS INDEPENDENT OF REMOVAL. Rules are created and deleted by their
comment tag; they are verified by parsing the kernel's own FIELDS (chain,
destination, dport, to-ports) with no reference to the comment. Status detects
duplicates, incomplete pairs, conflicting targets under one name, and foreign
redirects on the same port -- which it reports but never deletes. `off` removes
only rules bearing this switch's exact tag, then re-reads the table to confirm.
THREE BUGS FOUND WHILE BUILDING IT, all in the same family as the original
lying rollback:
1. Renaming the tag ORPHANED live rules. Gate 10 deliberately ended with the
switch on, so rules carrying the old tag were still installed and the
renamed tool could not see them -- `off` would have reported success while
traffic stayed redirected. Hence --legacy-tag: a rename must not strand
rules it owns.
2. Deleting by re-feeding the raw `iptables-save` line through the shell fails
on this iptables, which prints `--comment "tag"` WITH quotes; word-splitting
leaves the quotes inside the value so nothing matches. Bare-comment rules
deleted fine, which is exactly what made it look like it worked. Deletes are
now rebuilt from parsed fields and passed as argv elements.
3. `IFS=$'\t' read` collapsed consecutive tabs because tab is IFS *whitespace*,
so an absent `-s` shifted every later field left and produced
`-s <dport> --dport <to_ports> --to-ports ''`. Harmless here, but a shifted
spec that matched a real rule would delete the wrong one. Now uses \x1f.
Mutation-tested against all seven required cases: wrong intercept port, wrong
target port, missing rule, duplicate rule, changed comment representation
(bare vs quoted), and a rollback that leaves a foreign redirect installed --
which exits non-zero rather than claiming success.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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funman300
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c5807c07a9 |
blaze-host: passive ClientHello observer for the redirector TLS decision
The redirector TLS question cannot be answered from the cipher OpenSSL selected: its server follows client preference by default, so FIFA preferring static RSA does not prove ECDHE was unavailable. Choosing a TLS stack on that inference would be a guess. This reads the actual ClientHello. PASSIVE BY CONSTRUCTION. Bytes relay verbatim both ways, nothing is injected or rewritten, and the handshake is still terminated by the untouched Python redirector. A parse failure logs and relays anyway -- observation must never be able to break the path it observes. Reports record/client version, supported_versions, SNI, every offered suite by name, extensions, and a verdict on whether ANY forward-secret suite is offered, which is exactly the rustls question. Unknown suites print as hex rather than being dropped. Verified end to end against the live Python redirector with openssl s_client: 31 offered suites parsed, 18 classified forward-secret, and Python logged the relayed request and served its 406B serverinstanceinfo -- proving observation AND pass-through in one run. Unit-tested on truncated and non-TLS input; the verdict is asserted in both directions so a static-RSA-only hello reports RULED OUT rather than defaulting to the permissive answer. NOTE: that 18-suite result is from openssl s_client, NOT from FIFA. It proves the instrument works. The actual question is still open until a retail FIFA ClientHello is captured. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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funman300
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8f5f54833f |
ci: tripwire against lab addresses creeping back into tracked source
Cheap insurance, explicitly not the real check -- the semantic tests in
deployment_config.rs are what prove propagation, using two TEST-NET addresses
and bind != advertise. This grep only stops the lab subnet reappearing months
from now when the reasoning has been forgotten.
Deployment config legitimately contains real addresses and lives in gitignored
files, so it is never scanned. The frozen baseline doc is allowlisted BY PATH:
it records what a past deployment actually was, and rewriting it would falsify
the record.
Also swapped the lab IP for a TEST-NET placeholder in the usage examples and
error messages of compose/entrypoint/client_arm. Those were already correct
architecture -- every one requires the address via ${VAR:?} -- but using the
real lab IP as the example is the same 'happens to match our lab' smell, and
placeholders keep the tripwire allowlist near-empty.
Mutation-tested: adding a lab address to a source file makes it exit 1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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funman300
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f451406058 |
audit: eliminate deployment-address hardcoding; single typed endpoint config
Mandatory OpenFUT architecture audit. Two real defects found and fixed, plus
the config surface tightened so neither class can recur.
DEFECT 1 -- hidden localhost fallback. The Rust host defaulted POW hosts to
127.0.0.1 while every other URL followed OPENFUT_ADVERTISE, so a remote
deployment would emit loopback POW URLs and fail far from the cause. It also
diverged from the deployed Python entrypoint, which derives them
(POW_HOST="${POW_HOST:-$ADV:8094}"). POW endpoints now derive from the
advertised address; explicit overrides still win.
DEFECT 2 -- Default gave loopback silently. `Endpoints::default()` and
`AdapterConfig::default()` supplied 127.0.0.1, so anything constructing a
config by omission got loopback with no signal. Both `Default` impls are
REMOVED. Loopback is now `Endpoints::loopback()` / `AdapterConfig::loopback()`:
an explicit, greppable decision. Production uses `advertising(host)`.
CONFIGURABILITY. `blaze_port` and `utas_port` are now config, not literals.
The advertised Blaze port is our choice -- the client goes wherever
<serverinstanceinfo> sends it -- and 8099 is the client's own built-in default
but still deployment config. A bad port value is an error, not a silent
fallback to the previous one.
TEST-NET EVERYWHERE. Committed fixtures and tests used the lab's real LAN
address; a test that passes because its constant matches the current lab
proves nothing about relocatability. Redirector fixtures regenerated on
RFC 5737 TEST-NET-1/2/3 plus loopback. Harness scripts no longer default the
client IP to the lab address -- client-state.sh now requires it.
SEVEN REQUIRED TESTS in tests/deployment_config.rs plus host-side coverage:
remote config never silently becomes localhost; missing advertise fails
clearly; bind may differ from advertise; changing the Blaze port changes the
redirect; changing the host updates all 200+ generated URLs with no
stragglers; no helper bypasses central config; mutations are detectable.
MUTATION TESTED, and it found a hole in the audit tests themselves. Hardcoding
utas_base, reverting the POW derivation and re-hardcoding the Blaze port were
all caught. Making the redirector read `bind` instead of `advertise` was NOT:
`advertising()` sets bind == advertise, so the two sources were
indistinguishable. That is the single most likely bypass -- the oracle really
does read bind for nucleusConnect -- so the test now forces bind != advertise
and asserts the bind address never reaches the wire. Re-mutated: caught.
Wire behaviour unchanged: oracle fixtures still current, 153 tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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funman300
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8aab2c0d41 |
adapter: FIFA 17 redirector response; Nucleus deliberately not ported
REDIRECTOR. The first hop's <serverinstanceinfo> XML, byte-for-byte against the oracle across three advertised addresses. Owns the response only; TLS and HTTP transport belong to a host, exactly as the Blaze adapter owns dispatch while the sidecar owns the socket. The <secure>0</secure> field is the client being told the second hop is plaintext -- independent corroboration of the plaintext Blaze finding, now expressed in code. NUCLEUS IS NOT PORTED, and that is a finding rather than an omission. Instrumented across every live session: listener bound YES 0.0.0.0:42131 since 00:21:32 handler logs on connect YES unconditional, before any parsing client received the URL YES OSDK_NUCLEUS fetched 10+ times client connected NO zero requests, including 4 full FUT flows So the long-standing nucleusConnect=0.0.0.0 anomaly is explained: FIFA never follows that URL on this path. The invalid address has never mattered because nothing dials it. Porting the stub would add an untested component for no parity gain. TLS CONSTRAINT RECORDED, NOT RESOLVED. All 9 observed handshakes negotiated AES256-GCM-SHA384 = TLS 1.2 with STATIC RSA key exchange. rustls supports only forward-secret (EC)DHE suites and cannot serve that. Whether the client also OFFERS ECDHE is unknown -- OpenSSL follows client preference by default, so preferring static RSA does not prove it is the only option. This must be instrumented from a real ClientHello before a TLS stack is chosen; the module docs say so rather than guessing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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funman300
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ed0ccb8c2b |
blaze-host: check client sessions in BOTH network namespaces
Host-side ss cannot see the Python backend's connections: the responders run in a container, so a client session terminates at 172.20.0.2:42130 inside its namespace and the host only sees the NAT'd flow. 'ss | grep <client>' on the host therefore reports nothing while a session is very much alive. That produced a wrong precondition: 'no .105 Blaze session -- closed' was reported while FIFA was mid-session on Python, and gate 9 was armed against a client that had never exited. Python's own log had the answer -- it logs closes reliably and there was no close for that session. client-state.sh looks in both namespaces, reports Rust and Python separately, and exits non-zero while any session is live. An unreachable container counts as 'cannot confirm', not as 'clear'. Fourth measurement bug in this tooling, and the most consequential: the other three mis-COUNTED, this one mis-STATED a precondition and caused an action. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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funman300
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b40adac3fc |
gate-evidence: window FUT-action counts to the gate, not the whole log
'pack opens recorded: 45' appeared in the gate 8 report. The UTAS log is cumulative across the entire deployment, so a bare count reads as if 45 packs were opened during that gate; the real number was 1. Now reports both, labelled, windowed from the sidecar's start time (it is restarted per gate, so that is the gate boundary). A bare count in a gate report will be read as belonging to that gate, so it has to be the one that does. Third counting bug in this tooling: the trace frame counter matched OPEN/CLOSE markers, the capture and trace were read seconds apart during a live session, and now this. Evidence tooling gets the same scrutiny as the code under test. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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funman300
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bfb7876ed4 |
gate-evidence: count trace frames correctly, archive the raw capture, observe FUT actions
Three fixes, all found while closing out gate 7.
1. Frame count was wrong. It counted lines matching '^conn-', which also
matches the OPEN/CLOSE lifecycle markers, inflating the figure by one or
two. Compared against the capture's record count that looked like a
capture/trace divergence (89 vs 88) when there was none: read at the same
instant, both report 99. Evidence tooling that miscounts is exactly what
this project cannot afford.
2. The raw capture is now copied into the evidence bundle (0600), so a gate's
forensic bytes travel with its report.
3. FUT actions are now observed on the UTAS side. 'Known FUT action succeeded'
is a client-side fact, but FUT actions go over UTAS -- which is never
switched -- so the UTAS log confirms them independently of anyone's
recollection. Gate 7's pack open shows up as:
STORE: opened pack Special Players Pack -> 11 items
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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funman300
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55b4e54d5f |
gate-evidence: add the Python-side positive/negative observation
'Rust did not receive it' is weaker than 'Python did'. The redirector always
runs on Python and is never switched, so it advertises the Blaze endpoint on
every run; whether Python then receives the Blaze CONNECT it just advertised
says where the hop actually went.
This is already visible in the existing logs and settles gate 5-6 more firmly
than the sidecar record alone:
02:02:13 Python REDIR SENT -> 10.10.0.120:42130 (to .105)
02:02:13 Rust conn-0005 CONNECT from 10.10.0.105
Python received NO Blaze CONNECT
Same second, both sides: Python advertised the endpoint and did not get the
connection; Rust did. It is also the mechanism gate 8 needs in reverse.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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funman300
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fafa2f1858 | blaze-host: document capture, sanitization, and what the tests do not cover | ||
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funman300
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c84fd14cac |
blaze-host: make the build stamp trustworthy for evidence attribution
Committing updates refs/heads/<branch>, not the HEAD file, so watching HEAD alone left the stamp one commit behind -- observed live, the banner read |
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funman300
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23374312bc |
blaze-host: opt-in raw frame capture + auditable sanitizer
Evidence infrastructure, not protocol functionality. Built before gates 7-10
because those sessions cannot be reproduced -- a later run is a different
session, and the migration-validation runs happen once. Gates 5-6 already went
past without their bytes being recorded.
TWO LAYERS
live FIFA traffic
├── raw capture exact RX/TX bytes, mode 0600, gitignored
└── blaze-sanitize → repository-safe, replayable fixtures
CAPTURE. Off unless OPENFUT_BLAZE_CAPTURE names a file. Deterministic
big-endian container: 20-byte file header, then per-frame records carrying
connection id, a global monotonic sequence, timestamp, direction and the EXACT
frame bytes. RX is recorded as received; TX only AFTER a successful write, so a
record means the bytes were sent rather than intended.
Component/command/msgNum/msgType/payload length are deliberately NOT stored
beside the frame: they are already in its 16-byte header, and a redundant copy
can disagree with the bytes, leaving a reader unable to tell which is true.
Record::header() derives them, so every field the requirements name is
available without duplicating it.
SANITIZER. Redacts only the named tags in SENSITIVE_TAGS (KEY, AUTH, SESS,
MAIL, PML) and reports every substitution with path, kind and length.
Replacement is LENGTH-PRESERVING, so the TDF varint, payload length and Fire2
header are unchanged and the sanitized frame is exactly the size of the
captured one -- asserted per frame, failing rather than emitting a subtly
different conversation. Frames with nothing sensitive keep their exact wire
bytes. Payloads that will not decode are passed through and REPORTED, so a
reader knows they were never inspected rather than assuming they were checked.
TESTS. 39 in this crate. All nine required cases: capture disabled produces no
artefact; RX and TX captured exactly; ordering preserved; fragmented input
(one byte at a time) reconstructs the same frames as a single write; coalesced
input is captured as separate frames, not per-read; capture does not alter wire
output; sanitization removes a real session key from a real captured login;
malformed/truncated/wrong-version captures fail clearly; every listed sensitive
tag is provably reachable.
MUTATION TESTED. Dropping TX capture, truncating captured frames to their
header, and removing KEY from the sensitive list were each verified to turn the
suite red. One mutation was NOT caught: moving the TX capture above the write.
It is indistinguishable while writes succeed and only diverges when one fails.
That invariant is held by code placement and a comment saying so, not by a
test, and the code says as much rather than implying coverage it does not have.
Python oracle unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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funman300
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a84a72e0c0 |
blaze-host: A/B the RPC routes a real FIFA session actually used
The gate 5-6 live run exercised 14 RPCs the recorded fixtures never covered -- Stats, Clubs, OSDKSettings, SponsoredEvents, Messaging::fetchMessages, Util::getTelemetryServer, Util::userSettingsLoadAll, UserSessions cmd 0x0008, and the transport PING -- every one taking the empty-reply fallback. That Python does the same was an inference from reading its dispatch table. This sends those exact routes to both backends and diffs the replies: 14/14 byte-identical. Worth keeping: the fixtures were built from what the responder implements, so they could never have covered what the client asks for and the responder does not. Only a live session reveals that surface, and this makes it checkable afterwards. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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funman300
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6c102f00c0 |
gitignore: gate-evidence bundles are run artefacts, not source
They contain live traces and logs from a specific run; they belong with the run, not in the tree. |
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funman300
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48aa955212 |
blaze-host: per-gate evidence capture, separating asserted from observed
For the live FIFA gates. Records switch rules, sidecar status, log, trace and the Python contract result into a timestamped bundle, and reports CONFIGURED and OBSERVED state as two distinct sections. The separation is the whole point. 'blaze-switch.sh status = ON' is an assertion produced by the same tooling that performs the switch, and that tooling reported a successful rollback once when none had happened. The observed half comes from an unrelated source: the sidecar's own record of which peers connected to it. A non-loopback peer in that log proves the client's Blaze traffic landed on Rust without depending on reading an iptables rule correctly. Verified both ways: loopback-only traffic reports 'a FIFA session did NOT land here'; a non-loopback peer reports that it observably did. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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funman300
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cf3ddde3a6 |
blaze-host: move the dirty-tree safeguard to launch and evidence time
The compiled-in dirty flag cannot be trusted for this job. Cargo does not
re-run a build script when another crate's source changes, so editing the
adapter and rebuilding the host leaves it reading 'clean' -- verified by
appending a line to the adapter and watching the flag not move.
So the stamp now only names the commit, and the real safeguards run at the
moment they matter and cannot go stale:
* sidecar.sh checks the working tree at LAUNCH and warns.
* check-live-parity.sh REFUSES on a dirty tree, since it produces the
artefact a migration decision is made from. ALLOW_DIRTY=1 overrides for a
throwaway check.
Both scope to the three migration crates, so unrelated submodule dirt does not
trigger them -- a warning that is always on is a warning nobody reads.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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funman300
|
468b006008 |
blaze-host: scope the dirty-tree check to the crates the binary is built from
A whole-repo check read DIRTY permanently, because unrelated submodules carry pre-existing modifications. A warning that is always on is a warning nobody reads, which defeats the point: the flag exists so a mutated build announces itself before it can be mistaken for parity evidence. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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funman300
|
e091921b18 |
blaze-host: safe sidecar lifecycle, Blaze switch, build identity
Prerequisites for the live FIFA A/B. Two safeguards here exist because the corresponding failure actually happened, not because it was imagined. BUILD IDENTITY. build.rs stamps commit + working-tree cleanliness; the host prints commit, tree state, profile and a fingerprint of the bundled config table at startup, into both the log and the trace. A dirty tree prints an explicit "do NOT treat results from this binary as parity evidence" warning. The previous step left four sidecars running, two serving mutated builds, and nothing in their output said so. SIDECAR LIFECYCLE (sidecar.sh). start/stop/status/check-orphans/with. Start refuses when any sidecar is already running or the port is busy. Stop kills, waits, then PROVES it: PID gone AND port free AND no stray processes, failing if any check does not hold. `with -- CMD` traps EXIT/INT/TERM so cleanup runs however the command exits. Bug found and fixed while testing it: orphan detection used `pgrep -f`, which matched any process whose command line merely mentioned the name -- including the shell running the test script. It now matches the resolved executable via /proc/PID/exe. `pgrep -x` is unusable because Linux truncates the process name to "openfut-blaze-h". BLAZE SWITCH (blaze-switch.sh). Redirects Blaze to the sidecar with a scoped NAT rule instead of editing the frozen Python oracle, whose redirector advertises a hardcoded BLAZE_PORT = 42130. Rules match only <LAN_IP>:42130; 127.0.0.1:42130 is deliberately left alone so Python stays reachable on loopback and the A/B compares real Python against real Rust. Verified both directions live: LAN->Rust with the switch on, LAN->Python with it off. Bug found and fixed: `off` reported success while two rules remained active and rollback had NOT happened. It matched `--comment "tag"` with quotes this iptables does not emit -- and the verification used the SAME broken matcher, so it confirmed its own failure. A rollback that lies is worse than one that fails. Now matched on the bare tag, verified with iptables-save plus a tag-independent check that nothing still redirects the port. Second flaw fixed: `sidecar.sh stop` originally warned about a live switch and then stopped anyway, creating the exact broken state it warned about. It now REFUSES, with --force as the deliberate override. The general rule this all converges on, now stated in the README: a verification must not share the failure mode of the thing it verifies. 116 tests still passing; clippy clean; Python backend untouched and contract suite 446/446. NAT table left clean, no orphan processes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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funman300
|
a9eb54ae9c |
openfut-blaze-host: thin Blaze sidecar, live-parity with Python
Third migration step, and the one that turns fixture parity into transport parity. A TCP host that frames a Fire2 stream, keeps one Session per connection, calls openfut-adapter-fifa17::dispatch(), and writes the returned frames in order. It owns a socket, a buffer, a session and diagnostics -- that is the complete list. No coins, club, packs, profiles or UTAS logic: those belong to Core, reached through the adapter later. NO TLS, and that is evidence-based rather than an omission. The Blaze main port is plaintext: sending a raw Fire2 Util::ping to the running backend returns a plaintext PingResponse, blaze_handle uses the raw socket, and only redir_handle wraps ssl. TLS belongs to the redirector phase. LIVE A/B AGAINST THE RUNNING PYTHON BACKEND: 101 frames across three conversations, identical normalized traces. This is the first result in the migration that is not purely offline. check-live-parity.sh replays the recorded conversations against both endpoints over real sockets and diffs volatile-masked traces; session keys and clocks are masked, so anything that differs is behavioural. Transport tests cover what fixtures cannot: byte-for-byte replay over a socket, requests dribbled one byte at a time, several requests in one write, the four-frame login burst ordered on the wire, session state persisting across frames and NOT leaking between connections, an absurd payload length closing the connection instead of allocating, and an undecodable body still getting a reply. 18 tests here, 116 across the three migration crates. MUTATION TESTED, including the comparison itself. Dropping a post-login notification is caught by the probe (frame count) AND the diff; a same-length content change deep inside a notification body (CTY "US"->"GB", payload 116 both sides) is caught ONLY by the trace digest. So the probe's exit code is not the test -- the diff is, and the README says so. check-live-parity.sh was itself verified to exit 1 under mutation. The listen port is required configuration with no default, so the sidecar cannot silently collide with the working container. OPENFUT_BIND stays the advertised-config bind (the adapter derives nucleusConnect from it, reproducing the oracle) and the listener gets its own setting, so the two are not conflated. Gates 1-4 pass and are re-runnable. Gates 5-10 need a FIFA client and are listed in the README, including the Python -> Rust -> Python -> Rust back-and-forth that proves the rollback path rather than asserting it. Python backend untouched and still the live runtime; contract suite 446/446 after this work. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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funman300
|
cf961603fe |
openfut-adapter-fifa17: FIFA 17 Blaze adapter, oracle-tested
The second migration step: the layer above the codec, deciding WHAT to say
rather than how to encode it. Sits on openfut-protocol-blaze and supplies
what that crate deliberately refuses to know.
blaze/ids.rs component/command/notification tables
blaze/config.rs injectable identity + endpoints, nothing hardcoded
blaze/session.rs per-connection state
blaze/client_config.rs the fetchClientConfig tables
blaze/responses.rs 16 Blaze::* response bodies
blaze/dispatch.rs (component, command) -> Vec<Frame>
Parity is tested, not asserted. fixtures/generate.py drives the real
blaze_responder_v3b.dispatch() and records 49 request->response(s)
transactions, replayed in order against a shared session per connection so
ordering-dependent behaviour is exercised: preAuth captures the locale later
ALOC fields echo, login sets the auth code getAuthToken returns. Comparison
is byte-for-byte including frame count and order.
98 tests green across both crates; clippy clean.
MUTATION TESTED, and it found a real defect in this commit's own design.
Swapping two post-login notifications and flipping one enum inside
AccountInfo both turned the suite red as intended. Hardcoding an address in
utas_base() did NOT -- the config templating substituted raw hosts directly,
making those helpers dead code that merely looked load-bearing. The table now
templates on URL-level tokens ({utas_base}, {nucleus_base},
{pow_content_url}) so they are the single place a URL shape is defined, and
the mutation is caught.
The client config table (227-243 rows per CFID) is generated from the oracle
rather than transcribed: it is reverse-engineered data, not logic, and 400
hand-copied string literals would add a typo class no reviewer can catch. The
generator substitutes real addresses back in and diffs against the oracle for
every section before writing, so the templating is verified rather than
assumed.
Reproduces one known defect deliberately: nucleusConnect is built from BIND,
not advertise, so the live split deployment tells a client on another machine
to reach Nucleus at http://0.0.0.0:42131. Confirmed against the running
container. Reproduced because it is what the only proven-working config does;
fixing it needs live validation and is a separate change. It also implies the
Nucleus stub is not reached in the current remote flow.
Blaze carries no FUT domain state -- no coins, packs, clubs or squads on this
wire -- so Session stays a session key, locale, service name, auth code and a
flag. That boundary will need defending when UTAS is migrated.
Not wired into anything. The crate answers frames; it opens no socket and
owns no runtime. The Python backend remains the live service and the oracle,
and is unmodified (contract suite still green).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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funman300
|
cc3ecddc06 |
openfut-protocol-blaze: pin advertise/bind so fixtures do not depend on the shell
The responder reads OPENFUT_ADVERTISE/OPENFUT_BIND at import time and several live payloads embed the advertised address (Blaze redirect target, RS4/POW/ roster URLs). Without pinning, regenerating on a machine that exports OPENFUT_ADVERTISE produces different bytes and --check goes red for a reason that has nothing to do with the codec. Pinned to 127.0.0.1 as a placeholder so no real LAN address is baked into a committed fixture. Not a claim about deployment: remote mode still requires an explicit advertised address and has no loopback fallback. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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funman300
|
a9a816e0ed |
openfut-protocol-blaze: generic Blaze protocol layer, oracle-tested
First Rust component of the Python -> Rust migration. Chosen first because
it is the lowest genuinely game-independent layer, it has an executable
oracle, and both existing Rust implementations of it are wrong.
Contents:
* fire2 -- the proven 16-byte frame header, frame/stream splitting
* heat2 -- tag packing, varints, all 11 TDF value types
* message -- frame + decoded body, routed by NUMERIC component/command
* diagnostics -- dumps for capture review
No FIFA 17 command tables, response schemas or notification IDs: this layer
knows 0x0009/0x0007 is component 9, command 7, not that it means
Util::preAuth. That mapping belongs to a game adapter, which is what lets a
future FIFA 18/23 adapter reuse this.
Parity is tested, not asserted. fixtures/generate.py drives the proven
Python responders (heat2.py, blaze_responder_v3b.py) and freezes 56 vectors
-- 31 of them real payloads from the responder's own builders, including
the 11.8 KB preAuth reply. tests/oracle_parity.rs replays every one
byte-for-byte. 54 tests green; clippy clean.
Supersedes two wrong framings, neither of which is removed yet:
* fifa-blaze/crates/blaze-proto/frame.rs -- a 12-byte header with a u16
length, nibble-packed type/options, an error field and a JUMBO flag.
A documented guess at FIFA 23 predating the FIFA 17 recon.
* heat2.py::build_fire2_frame -- packs >IHHHHB3s, msgId at [10:12] and
msgType at [12]. Dead code, but its docstring still states that layout.
Confidence is carried in the types: TypeId::is_verified() reports which
layouts are capture-backed (int/string/blob/struct) and which the oracle
marks UNVERIFIED (list/map/union/varlist/objtype/objid/float), with a test
asserting the unverified ones stay flagged.
Cargo.lock is deliberately NOT included: it re-resolves ~240 lines against
the current registry even without this crate, so that churn is pre-existing
and does not belong in a foundation commit.
The Python backend remains the live runtime and is untouched. Nothing
consumes this crate yet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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funman300
|
3153a93edf |
fifa17-recon: drop superseded docker-side tools/data copies
fifa17-recon/tools (authoritative) and fifa17-recon/data now feed the Docker build directly via the curated runtime-tools.list manifest. The duplicated fifa17-python/tools+data are removed so the repo has a single source of truth; the rebuilt openfut-fut-backend:dev image is byte-identical to the previous deployment (verified: manifest diff empty, 446/446 contract checks pass). |
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funman300
|
f64106ed8b | fifa17-recon: fix compose dockerfile path for relocated build context | ||
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funman300
|
9faaf12dd7 |
fifa17-recon: Docker build consumes authoritative tools via curated manifest
Build context moves from docker/fifa17-python/ up to fifa17-recon/ so the Dockerfile reads the single-source tools/ and data/ trees. Only the 77 runtime files listed in runtime-tools.list are installed into /app/tools (baseline image minus the two git-ignored certs, regenerated in-image). memdump and recon artifacts are excluded via fifa17-recon/.dockerignore. |
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funman300
|
83539e33ec |
fifa17-recon: take running-backend versions of 8 runtime files (direction fix)
The earlier reconcile committed the local working-tree versions of these files, which are OLDER than the deployed backend. The running container (C) is byte-identical to docker/fifa17-python/tools (B) and is a strict superset: it adds profile_path_for/select_account/ensure_security_question (fut_store), safe_header_for_log/safe_request_path/security_question_route (utas_server), account_sync_route/_match_call/match_ready_body, plus POW balance fields and match lifecycle support, with zero unique local functions lost. Reconciled tree is now a strict superset of B with every shared file byte-identical; verified via md5 map (0 missing, 0 differing). |
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funman300
|
695421cfd4 | Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into fifa17-fut-squad-and-userinfo | ||
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funman300
|
8cba70dc90 |
fifa17-recon: reconcile authoritative tools with running backend (B)
- Add 8 files present in docker/fifa17-python/tools but missing from the top-level tree: fut_accounts.py + 7 test_*.py contracts (all committed in the server's docker tree; byte-identical to the running image). - Preserve newer responder work already matching the running container: utas_server.py (offlineSeason), lsx_responder_v2.py (OPENFUT_BIND), blaze_responder_v3b.py, autopatch.py, pow_server.py, fut_store.py, test_fut_contract.py, fifa17-hook-m1.sh. - Add 30 newer ghidra_queries (draft purchase/state, SBC 9-26, runtime registries). Local tree is now a strict superset of B with all shared files byte-identical. |
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root
|
28773e7cf1 |
fifa17-python: sync tools to running container state
The frozen baseline image predates two hot-patches made in the running container after build: * utas_server.py: FUT_MODES-gated offlineSeason block in GetHubData's club response (keeps the offline-season summary valid) * test_hub_offline_season_contract.py added to /app/tools Sync fifa17-python/tools to the running container (verified byte-identical, 237 files incl. the redir cert pair) and snapshot the live FS as openfut-fut-backend:python-running-2026-08-10 (docker commit). A fresh build from the committed sources now reproduces the running backend exactly (baked SHA256SUMS.txt diffed against the container manifest: identical).python-fifa17-baseline-2026-08-10 |
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root
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3ae5587a38 | docs: baseline manifest equivalence note (pycache + cert deltas expected) | ||
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root
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70a64e3709 |
fifa17-python: commit working FUT backend deployment (client/server split)
Freeze the running offline FUT backend into version control as fifa17-recon/docker/fifa17-python/ - declarative and rebuildable from a fresh checkout: * OPENFUT_BIND / OPENFUT_ADVERTISE client/server split in the responders (lsx, blaze, roster, utas, pow) + entrypoint.sh; OPENFUT_ADVERTISE is required for remote mode (compose and entrypoint fail without it) * docker-compose.yml reproducing the frozen baseline container exactly (env, ports incl. the 8085->8080 POW-content remap, /state bind, restart) * .env.example / .env for site config - the LAN IP is never hardcoded in source * tools/ + data/ staged from openfut-fut-backend:python-baseline-2026-08-10, verified byte-identical to the running container at freeze time * client_arm.sh (the 105 client-side arming counterpart) * Dockerfile bakes /app/SHA256SUMS.txt so any image is self-identifying * docs/BASELINE-python-2026-08-10.md: frozen image/container/hash record, restore instructions and rebuild-equivalence procedure Secrets (redir key/cert, .env) and runtime state (docker/state) stay gitignored. The live container is untouched pending the .105 launcher audit. |
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funman300
|
622a774f6a |
chore: update openfut-launcher submodule to feat/sbc-hook-tracing branch
Tracks SBC hook tracing PR #1 for FIFA 17 reverse-engineering |
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funman300
|
cc694774a3 | wip: checkpoint FIFA 17 SBC research for Windows migration | ||
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funman300
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3d3239bab9 | feat: document and stage FIFA 17 SBC hook workflow | ||
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funman300
|
a7e3e43ae9 |
fifa17-recon: the refusing modes have no server fix, and the hub-atom lead is cosmetic too
Completed the refusing-modes workflow (ground truth + 4 per-mode investigations + adversarial verify each + synthesis). All four mode families -- Seasons, Draft, SBC/Objectives, Tournaments -- are NOT_SERVER_REACHABLE, HIGH confidence, all four adversarial refutations failed. Live re-confirmed on pid 24653 (slide proven via FNV control): every named mode-gating byte reads ENABLED=1 (IS_FRIENDLY_SEASON_ENABLED +0x1fd3a, IS_TOURNAMENT_QUIT_ENABLED +0x1fd3b, IS_DRAFT_MODE_ENABLED +0x1fd3d, plus the unnamed offline-draft-enable +0x1fd3e) yet the tiles stay greyed. The new lead this pass added -- do the six /hub mode sub-objects gate availability? -- is refuted: friendlySeason/offlineSeason/onlineSeason/draftSummary/tournament/ tournamentProgress carry only stats and display strings, no enabled/available/ unlocked atom. They are cosmetic, exactly like hub.tradePile. The one server-writable input that exists (friendlySeasonsEnabled -> +0x1fd3a via applier FUN_18011dc50) has its sole reader in the packed FIFA17.exe front-end via a vtable getter with no CardsDLL caller, and it is already 1. The refusal is decided in the Denuvo-packed Frostbite front-end, which has no server surface. docs/plan-2026-08-06-refusing-modes.md: full evidence chains, gate-byte table, the six sub-deser field maps, per-mode verdicts. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Lrx9to3pihN6Sm9sXgc8np |
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funman300
|
31fc590b99 |
fifa17-recon: the FUT-hub Transfer List tile counts, and the hub parser is NOT reflection
The Transfer List hub tile read "0 items / Selling 0" while a card was actively
listed. Enumerating the /hub parser FUN_180139610 straight from the on-disk
CardsDLL (objdump) refutes the old ENDPOINT_MAP claim that it uses C++ reflection
with "no atom ladder, nothing to enumerate": it has an ordinary running-sum atom
ladder reading 18 atoms. The tile is fed by hub.tradePile (0x333), a nested object
(sub-deser 0x18013ead0) reading count/selling/sold as scalar ints -- the same
scheme as GetAuctionCount, so serving it in the hub body is freeze-safe. The tile
never re-polls the standalone /tradePile/counts, which is why fixing that endpoint
alone did not move the tile.
Also: the hub tile polls LOWERCASE tradepile/counts while the Transfer List screen
uses camelCase tradePile; our case-sensitive routes matched only the screen, so the
tile's counts call fell through to /trade and got a shape the counts deser skips.
Made the tradePile routes case-insensitive.
And bake the proven transfer-market flags (FUT_TRADING/PILESIZES/TRADEABLE/
DISCARD_TABLE/DISCARD_SEND) into openfut-fut.sh so a plain `start` brings up the
working state instead of regressing trading to greyed-out.
- tools/utas_server.py: hub_data() serves tradePile:{count,selling,sold};
tradePile routes now re.I
- tools/openfut-fut.sh: utas launched with the working flag set
- docs/ENDPOINT_MAP.md: full 18-atom hub map + tile map, correction of the
reflection claim
- tools/ghidra_queries/objdump_atom_ladder.py: the objdump-based atom-ladder
decoder used to derive the above
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Lrx9to3pihN6Sm9sXgc8np
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funman300
|
245c22161b |
fifa17-recon: correct tradePile/counts shape, and narrow the marketdata array fix
Two follow-ups on the working transfer market.
1. GET /tradePile/counts now returns the FutGetAuctionCount shape
({count, maxAuctionsAllowed, offered, selling, sold}, all scalar ints, atoms
0xbc/0x1bf/0x1e5/0x2b8/0x2c9) via a dedicated route ordered before /tradePile.
Previously it fell through to tradepile_route and got the auction-LIST body, which
the counts deser skips, leaving every tally at its constructor default. Survivable
but wrong; the doc flags the loaded byte at +0x28 as gating a completion-handler
branch. selling reflects real STORE.listings().
2. Narrowed the marketdata bare-array fix to /pricelimits only. The client sends TWO
marketdata requests: /marketdata/pricelimits (GetSuggestedPricing, a bare array,
the thing that froze) and plain /marketdata?defId=N (price comparison, an OBJECT).
The prior commit returned the array for both, which the contract suite caught
(test_market_bodies: 'list' has no attribute get) -- plain /marketdata wants
{minPrice,maxPrice} and was never the freeze. Returning the array for it would be
the same desync in reverse. Now: pricelimits -> array, plain marketdata -> object.
The contract suite catching my over-broadened fix before it reached the game is the
suite doing its job. 439 contract checks pass, market unit suite passes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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funman300
|
43557989f5 |
fifa17-recon: the transfer market works -- listed a card end to end, no freeze
The subsystem that was fully greyed-out this morning now lists a card on the transfer
market: price screen, Submit, "your item is now up for trade", TRANSFER LIST 0/100,
auctionCount 1, and STORE.listings() holds the auction. Every step verified at the
instruction level first, then confirmed live. Three fixes, all behind flags, all off by
default until this run proved them.
1. WE WERE BANNING OUR OWN TRADING. userInfo.feature (atom 0x11c) is a RESTRICTION map,
not a grant; we sent feature={"trade":true}, which is a trade BAN. Verified in
q_feature_trade.py: FUN_18013ec10 parses feature/trade into userInfo+0x17c, and at
the massinfo END_OBJECT the client runs
cmp byte [rsi+0x17c],0 / jz skip / mov dword [rsi+0x50],0
feeding applier 0x18011dc91 -> IS_TRADING_ENABLED (model+0x1fd2e) = 0. It runs LAST
and unconditionally, which is why the gate read 0 all day regardless of /settings or
the Blaze config store. FUT_TRADING sends feature={} instead. Live: gate flipped
0 -> 1 on UT re-entry (model rebuilt, pointer changed, byte read 1).
2. TRANSFER LIST CAPACITY 0/0. pileSizeClientData (massinfo atom 0x227, parser
0x18013adb0) is the capacity, NOT the "MY CLUB counter" the old comment claimed.
Verified in q_pilesize_keys.py: exactly two storing arms, key 2 -> model+0x1fd1c
(TRADE_PILE_SIZE) and key 4 -> +0x1fd20 (watch list), every other key SKIP'd. The old
code would have sprayed the 246 club count into the capacity. FUT_PILESIZES sends
key 2 = 100, key 4 = 50. Live: capacity read 0 -> 100, header showed 0/100.
3. THE PRICE SCREEN FROZE THE CLIENT. GET marketdata/pricelimits was answered with an
OBJECT {minPrice,maxPrice}; the deser 0x180163ee0 reads a BARE TOP-LEVEL ARRAY
(root loop while tok != 0xd), so object-where-array desynced the SAX reader into the
0x1801c7f1a busy loop (confirmed live: utime climbing 227 ticks/s, core pinned).
Verified in q_pricelimits.py: element fields defId 0xcf, maxPrice 0x1c2, minPrice
0x1ca, all scalar ints. marketdata_route now returns a bare array, one element per
requested defId. Live: price screen opened and Submit succeeded.
Corrected along the way, all now in the code: two prior "trading root causes" from
earlier today were wrong (the Blaze IS_TRADING_ENABLED keys are output-only names, and
the applier is a virtual method at vtable+0x988, not unreachable). Those refutations are
recorded in blaze_responder_v3b.py and the doc.
Also lands the transfer-market recon doc (plan-2026-08-06-transfer-market.md) and the
market Ghidra query set.
Server-authoritative economy note: the 5% transfer fee and the price bands (currently a
150..15000 placeholder per defId) are not yet real; that is refinement, not a freeze.
The live-auction market SCREEN ("List on Transfer Market" browse) is a separate surface
still to do (P4 auction-counts route, P5 empty market bodies).
Live: 439 contract checks pass. Card listed and persisted, auctionCount 1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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funman300
|
a3fd51692f |
fifa17-recon: the trading gate is still shut, and two of yesterday's conclusions were wrong
Ships the club-item subtype correction and the tradeable plumbing, and records two
refutations of claims made earlier in the same session. Nothing here is a working fix
for trading; the honest state is that the gate is still closed and we now know more
about why.
REFUTED 1: "the Blaze client-config store opens the trading gate". It does not, and the
flag is inert. IS_TRADING_ENABLED is an OUTPUT NAME. FUN_18006cc60 is a publisher: at
0x18006ccc6 it calls [rax+0x270] to READ gate byte 0x1fd2e, then lea rdx,[
IS_TRADING_ENABLED] and hands the value out under that name. The only rip-relative
reference to the literal 0x1801fc118 in all of .text is that lea; there is no comparison
against it anywhere, so no client-config key of that name can be read as an input. That
also undermines the IS_* store keys shipped beside it: their apparent success was never
actually attributed to them.
REFUTED 2: "the gate byte flipped to 1". It reads 0. It was measured as 1 shortly after
CardsDLL mapped and that was over-claimed as a success; a thorough re-measurement read 0
on the SAME pid and model pointer, and a fresh session reads 0 with an unambiguous raw
dump (model+0x1fd18.. = 01000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 3c000000 01 01 00 01, the 00
being 0x1fd2e). Either the first read was transient or something clears it after login.
The only writer is FUN_18011dc50 at 0x18011dc91, so a 0 means something RAN and wrote it.
AND THE "/settings IS DEAD" CLAIM FALLS TOO. FUN_18011dc50 is not unreachable: it is a
VIRTUAL method at model vtable slot +0x988 (absolute pointer 0x18021cc28). A direct-call
search found no callers because Ghidra does not resolve virtual calls, which is the same
dispatch-form trap that has now produced seven wrong verdicts here. The real chain is
settings response -> FUN_180174630 -> FUN_18013c6d0 (deser)
-> completion callback FUN_180173e00 -> vt+0x988 and vt+0x998 -> gate bytes
and FUN_180173e00 bails before applying anything unless the int at response+0x1c is
zero. Which atom writes +0x1c is unknown and is the thing worth chasing.
The measurement behind that claim also had a gap: it checked +0x1fd14, +0x1fd4c and
+0x1fd54 for the maximumTradePileSize=77 probe but NOT +0x1fd1c, which is the actual
TRADE_PILE_SIZE (read via vt+0xa58 = FUN_18011bf30). So the probe never tested the field
it needed to. Serving 77 and reading +0x1fd1c is the clean falsifier and is still open.
Recovered and worth keeping: an authoritative slot-to-name table from the publisher.
vt+0x270 IS_TRADING_ENABLED -> +0x1fd2e vt+0x2b0 IS_FRIENDLY_SEASON_ENABLED -> +0x1fd3a
vt+0x2b8 IS_TOURNAMENT_QUIT_ENABLED -> +0x1fd3b vt+0x2c0 IS_PROCESSING_STATE_ENABLED -> +0x1fd3c
vt+0x2c8 IS_DRAFT_MODE_ENABLED -> +0x1fd3d vt+0x2d8 IS_STORY_MODE_REWARD_ENABLED -> +0x1fd3f
vt+0x2f0 IS_RETURNING_USER_REWARDS_SCREEN -> +0x1fd40 vt+0xa58 TRADE_PILE_SIZE -> +0x1fd1c
That also locates the red TRANSFER LIST 0/0: it is +0x1fd1c, currently 0.
WHAT IS ACTUALLY SHIPPED HERE, all default off:
* FUT_TRADEABLE sends untradeable=false. Verified landing at item+0x49 (stored
INVERTED by case 0x361) on a live club record. Applied on every READ path, not only
in _item(), because the save holds 246 items minted before the flag existed and the
club route serves them straight from the save. That gap was caught by reading the
served JSON, not by unit-testing the factory.
* FUT_TRADING adds tradingEnabled and IS_TRADING_ENABLED to the Blaze config. Kept
only as a record of the refutation, with the reasoning inline so nobody retries it.
* fut_clubitems FAMILIES subtypes corrected: kit 9, stadium 10, badge 11 (cardtype 7,
not 9), ball 30, league logo 31. Every previous value sat in the 0x91..0x96 TROPHY
block. probe_shelf's candidate set lacked 9, 10 and 11, so the probe route the docs
preferred could never have answered this for three of five families.
* Club kits and badges now carry teamid, reintroduced ALONE after the 2026-08-05 crash
(which was never bisected; value is the established suspect and that response also
carried 30 items across five wrong subtypes). itemType dropped: it was unobserved and
never copied into the record.
Live: 439 contract checks, 414 card-family checks, market suite, all pass. The transfer
market still refuses with zero requests and the menu entries are still greyed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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funman300
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e578443d73 |
fifa17-recon: tradingEnabled is 0, and that is why the transfer options are greyed out
Card-subsystem pass, 11 agents plus three adversarial verifiers. Full writeup in docs/plan-2026-08-06-card-subsystem.md. Two of the results below correct things I committed earlier today. THE GREYED-OUT TRANSFER OPTIONS ARE EXPLAINED. "Place on Transfer List" and "List on Transfer Market" have been disabled in the reveal screen and nobody knew why. TO_TRADE_PILE (FUN_1801a7260) requires BOTH item+0x49 tradeable AND a service gate at vtable slot +0x270. That slot is `movzx eax, byte [rcx+0x1fd2e]; ret`, and 0x1fd2e is the tradingEnabled gate byte. Read live and reproduced independently: slot +0x2b0 friendlySeasons disp 0x1fd3a VALUE=1 slot +0x2c8 draftMode disp 0x1fd3d VALUE=1 slot +0x2e0 packOpeningAnim disp 0x1fd45 VALUE=1 slot +0x270 tradingEnabled disp 0x1fd2e VALUE=0 tradingEnabled is the FIRST gate byte found that is not 1. This partly rehabilitates the settings work from this morning: that plan died because every gate it targeted already read 1, and the conclusion drawn was that the settings array does not matter. It does. It matters for a flag nobody was looking at, and tradingEnabled is ALREADY in _SETTINGS_KEEP, plumbed and never sent because _SETTINGS_MODE defaults to off. So the fix is two things, not one: FUT_SETTINGS=keep AND untradeable false. Shipping only the boolean would look like the finding failed. THE DISCARD "MISS" NEVER EXISTED, which corrects |
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funman300
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e3092ca0f9 |
fifa17-recon: the client now shows the quick-sell value it is actually paid
Follow-on to
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