21a81ad63c
Multi-agent pass over the store subsystem, 11 agents, findings run through three
adversarial verifiers. Full writeup in docs/plan-2026-08-05-store-subsystem.md.
THE REAL DISCARD TABLE IS RECOVERED. quick_sell() paid an invented rating tier
(600/300/150/50) that was wrong for every single card. The real table is
fcc_discardcoins in the client's own game DB, 141 rows keyed (cardtype, level, rare),
read out of the running client and verified 22/22 against live items:
value = round_half_up(rating * price / 100)
level = 3 if rating >= 75, 2 if 65..74, else 1 (0x180141e8a..0x180141ea3,
derived from rating, NOT a wire field)
cardtype = FUN_1800d8330(cardsubtypeid), decoded from its jump table and checked
across every subtype 0..599 with zero disagreements
A 94-rated gold rare is 752, not 600. A 76 rare is 608, not 150. A 55 bronze is 17,
not 50.
This also closes a disagreement nobody had noticed: the CLIENT already computes and
displays the correct value locally whenever our discardValue (atom 0xd7) is 0 or
absent. FUN_18013fe00 stores our value at item +0x38 and the guard at 0x180141025
skips the local computation when it is non-zero. So the screen has been showing the
real number while the server paid a made-up one, on every quick sell ever made.
Verified beyond what the report claimed, because a missing table row pays ZERO and
that would be a regression the old flat tier could not produce: across all 236 items
in the live profile, 230 map to cardtype 1 and 6 to cardtype 6, and NOT ONE would pay
0 coins. Table reproduces at 141 rows and the worked example lands exactly.
ZERO WIRE CHANGE, FUT_DISCARD_TABLE default off. Nothing new is sent; only the coin
figure the server credits moves. This is the patch worth defaulting on after one
in-game check, which is simply quick-selling a card and seeing the coins paid match
the value the card was already displaying.
THE GROUPING BUG IS NOT IN CARDSDLL, and the fix ranked first would have wasted a
launch. Live in the running client all three display groups own exactly the right
pack, there is exactly one copy of each pack record in 4 GiB, and nothing we send is
mis-parsed. The parsed model is correct and the Scaleform layer picks the wrong pack
when turning a tile click into a category id. displayGroupAssetId is served as 1/5/6
while the screen's category field reads 3, and group tiles carry a hardcoded
CATEGORY_ID of 0. Confirmed by direct read: ordinal 3, assetId 6, i.e. Premium, while
the last click was Gold.
The heap map that made this possible, all scoped to one pid: display-group vector
control block, 3 elements of 0x108; group record fields at +0x00 sortPriority,
+0x04 displayGroupAssetId, +0x40 a one-element pack vector; inner pack record 0x1a8
with packType at +0x38, ids at +0x70/+0xac, price at +0xa0, quantities at +0xc0..+0xd0.
extPrice SHOULD BE DELETED, not corrected. Both sub-parsers read only
externalPriceId; amount and currency are discarded. Sending the key at all creates an
"mtx" currency row that switches on a real-money price line the client can never fill
offline, which is the literal "or %1s" on every tile.
A WORRY NOBODY HAD RAISED, and I confirmed it from our own logs: the client has sent
packId 6 on every purchase it has ever made, four for four tonight and six for six
across history. We have never observed a successful buy of anything but Premium Gold.
Also settled: FUT_STORE_DISPLAYGROUP=0 is the right resting state, argued from
mechanism rather than from history; FUT_USERINFO=packs stays off because the
unopened-pack counter is client-mutable and the flag ladder silently drops squadList;
POST /user is a latent hard freeze that has never fired because the client never
issues that POST.
Honest coverage: the ActionScript layer is unread by everyone and every remaining
store mystery lives there.
Live: 439 contract checks pass, market suite passes, both flags off.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
103 lines
3.6 KiB
Python
103 lines
3.6 KiB
Python
"""DIMENSION 4 (duplicates), pass 6: exhaustive census, matcher generation 2.
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Pass 5's matcher M1 (single-expression nested +0x10) MISSED the IS-list consumer
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0x18013e7f0, which splits the access across two statements:
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lVar6 = *(longlong *)(*(longlong *)(lVar14 + 0x10) + 0xb0);
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... *(longlong *)(lVar6 + 0x10) = plVar13[2];
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So M1 alone cannot support an absence claim. M3 below does a textual
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def-use: any local assigned from a qword load, then used as base of a +0x10
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qword access.
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M3 = for every assignment `<var> = *(longlong *)(<anything>);` remember <var>;
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then flag the function if `<var> + 0x10)` appears anywhere.
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PLUS the M1 nested form. This is deliberately over-broad; the output is
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reviewed by hand.
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CONTROL: all six hand-known sites must be flagged:
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writers 0x180162880, 0x18013bd40, 0x1801293d0, 0x18013e7f0
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readers 0x180043880, 0x180094220
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If any is missed the pass is void for absence purposes.
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Also dumps the three functions M1 newly found (0x180094ae0, 0x180096490,
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0x18009bc40) and their callers, to name the UI screens involved.
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"""
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import re, traceback, time
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OUT = "/tmp/claude-1000/-home-alex-Documents-OpenFUT/8e521ca1-ca3e-4138-bb96-df1744dd1d30/scratchpad/store/dup6_out.txt"
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ASSIGN = re.compile(r"(\w+) = \*\(longlong \*\)\([^;\n]{0,120}\);")
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M1 = re.compile(r"\*\(longlong \*\)\(\*\(longlong \*\)\([^;\n]{0,80}?\) \+ 0x10\)")
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CONTROLS = [0x180162880, 0x18013BD40, 0x1801293D0, 0x18013E7F0, 0x180043880, 0x180094220]
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def hitlines(s, var):
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out = []
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pat = re.compile(r"\b%s \+ 0x10\b" % re.escape(var))
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for ln in s.split("\n"):
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if pat.search(ln):
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out.append(ln.strip())
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return out
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try:
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fh = open(OUT, "w")
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t0 = time.time()
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funcs = []
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it = fm.getFunctions(True)
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while it.hasNext():
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funcs.append(it.next())
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fh.write("total functions: %d\n" % len(funcs))
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flagged = {}
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n = 0
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for f in funcs:
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n += 1
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ent = int(f.getEntryPoint().getOffset())
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try:
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s = dec(ent, timeout=25)
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except Exception:
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continue
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if s.startswith("// decompile"):
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continue
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why = []
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if M1.search(s):
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why.append("M1:" + M1.search(s).group(0)[:70])
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for m in ASSIGN.finditer(s):
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v = m.group(1)
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hl = hitlines(s, v)
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if hl:
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why.append("M3[%s]: %s" % (v, hl[0][:110]))
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break
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if why:
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flagged[ent] = (f.getName(), why)
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if n % 2000 == 0:
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fh.write("... %d/%d %.0fs flagged=%d\n" % (n, len(funcs), time.time() - t0, len(flagged)))
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fh.flush()
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fh.write("\nSWEPT %d in %.0fs, flagged %d\n" % (n, time.time() - t0, len(flagged)))
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fh.write("\n=== CONTROL CHECK ===\n")
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ok = True
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for c in CONTROLS:
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fh.write(" %#x flagged=%s\n" % (c, c in flagged))
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ok = ok and (c in flagged)
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fh.write("ALL CONTROLS FLAGGED: %s\n" % ok)
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fh.write("\n=== flagged functions (%d) ===\n" % len(flagged))
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for ent in sorted(flagged):
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nm, why = flagged[ent]
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fh.write(" %#x %s\n" % (ent, nm))
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for x in why:
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fh.write(" %s\n" % x)
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fh.write("\n\n=== decompiles of the three NEW M1 functions ===\n")
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for a in (0x180094AE0, 0x180096490, 0x18009BC40):
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s = dec(a)
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fh.write("\n" + "#" * 68 + "\n# %#x len(src)=%d FULL\n" % (a, len(s)) + "#" * 68 + "\n")
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fh.write(s + "\n")
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fh.write("-- callers:\n")
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for frm, typ, fn, e in xrefs_to(a):
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fh.write(" %#x %s in %s @ %#x\n" % (frm, typ, fn, e))
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fh.close()
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print("WROTE", OUT)
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except Exception:
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traceback.print_exc()
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