funman300
21a81ad63c
Multi-agent pass over the store subsystem, 11 agents, findings run through three
adversarial verifiers. Full writeup in docs/plan-2026-08-05-store-subsystem.md.
THE REAL DISCARD TABLE IS RECOVERED. quick_sell() paid an invented rating tier
(600/300/150/50) that was wrong for every single card. The real table is
fcc_discardcoins in the client's own game DB, 141 rows keyed (cardtype, level, rare),
read out of the running client and verified 22/22 against live items:
value = round_half_up(rating * price / 100)
level = 3 if rating >= 75, 2 if 65..74, else 1 (0x180141e8a..0x180141ea3,
derived from rating, NOT a wire field)
cardtype = FUN_1800d8330(cardsubtypeid), decoded from its jump table and checked
across every subtype 0..599 with zero disagreements
A 94-rated gold rare is 752, not 600. A 76 rare is 608, not 150. A 55 bronze is 17,
not 50.
This also closes a disagreement nobody had noticed: the CLIENT already computes and
displays the correct value locally whenever our discardValue (atom 0xd7) is 0 or
absent. FUN_18013fe00 stores our value at item +0x38 and the guard at 0x180141025
skips the local computation when it is non-zero. So the screen has been showing the
real number while the server paid a made-up one, on every quick sell ever made.
Verified beyond what the report claimed, because a missing table row pays ZERO and
that would be a regression the old flat tier could not produce: across all 236 items
in the live profile, 230 map to cardtype 1 and 6 to cardtype 6, and NOT ONE would pay
0 coins. Table reproduces at 141 rows and the worked example lands exactly.
ZERO WIRE CHANGE, FUT_DISCARD_TABLE default off. Nothing new is sent; only the coin
figure the server credits moves. This is the patch worth defaulting on after one
in-game check, which is simply quick-selling a card and seeing the coins paid match
the value the card was already displaying.
THE GROUPING BUG IS NOT IN CARDSDLL, and the fix ranked first would have wasted a
launch. Live in the running client all three display groups own exactly the right
pack, there is exactly one copy of each pack record in 4 GiB, and nothing we send is
mis-parsed. The parsed model is correct and the Scaleform layer picks the wrong pack
when turning a tile click into a category id. displayGroupAssetId is served as 1/5/6
while the screen's category field reads 3, and group tiles carry a hardcoded
CATEGORY_ID of 0. Confirmed by direct read: ordinal 3, assetId 6, i.e. Premium, while
the last click was Gold.
The heap map that made this possible, all scoped to one pid: display-group vector
control block, 3 elements of 0x108; group record fields at +0x00 sortPriority,
+0x04 displayGroupAssetId, +0x40 a one-element pack vector; inner pack record 0x1a8
with packType at +0x38, ids at +0x70/+0xac, price at +0xa0, quantities at +0xc0..+0xd0.
extPrice SHOULD BE DELETED, not corrected. Both sub-parsers read only
externalPriceId; amount and currency are discarded. Sending the key at all creates an
"mtx" currency row that switches on a real-money price line the client can never fill
offline, which is the literal "or %1s" on every tile.
A WORRY NOBODY HAD RAISED, and I confirmed it from our own logs: the client has sent
packId 6 on every purchase it has ever made, four for four tonight and six for six
across history. We have never observed a successful buy of anything but Premium Gold.
Also settled: FUT_STORE_DISPLAYGROUP=0 is the right resting state, argued from
mechanism rather than from history; FUT_USERINFO=packs stays off because the
unopened-pack counter is client-mutable and the flag ladder silently drops squadList;
POST /user is a latent hard freeze that has never fired because the client never
issues that POST.
Honest coverage: the ActionScript layer is unread by everyone and every remaining
store mystery lives there.
Live: 439 contract checks pass, market suite passes, both flags off.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
56 lines
2.6 KiB
Python
56 lines
2.6 KiB
Python
"""DIMENSION 5 pass 5: (a) the CreateUser response object's own handler, which is what
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consumes starterPack/bonusPacks; (b) the other writer of model+0x20950; (c) the two
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0x273d event handlers; (d) callers of FUN_180017390 (the second caller of the count
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setter).
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Correction carried into this pass: pass 4's "model=False" filter was TOO NARROW. The
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userInfo deser reaches the model through the raw singleton FUN_18011a830, but UI code
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reaches the SAME object through the ref-counted service locator
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FUN_180009c80(&out, FUN_1800d7170()). Both then call slots 0x160 / 0x4d8 / 0x4e0 /
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0x530 on it, so the locator form is the same class. Do not read pass 4's False column
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as "not the model".
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CONTROL for the response-vtable walk: slot +0x08 of the resolved vtable must be the
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known deserializer 0x18014cc60. If it is not, the vtable is the wrong one and every
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other slot read from it is meaningless.
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"""
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import traceback, os
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OUT = "/tmp/claude-1000/-home-alex-Documents-OpenFUT/8e521ca1-ca3e-4138-bb96-df1744dd1d30/scratchpad/store"
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try:
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print("### FUN_18014c810 (CreateUser response ctor)")
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src = dec(0x18014c810, 300)
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print(src)
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open(os.path.join(OUT, "dec_ctor_18014c810.c"), "w").write(src)
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# find the vtable it installs: any .rdata address referenced whose +8 is 0x18014cc60
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print("\n### hunting the response vtable (control: slot +0x08 == 0x18014cc60)")
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hits = find_all((0x18014cc60).to_bytes(8, "little"), blocks=(".rdata", ".data"))
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for h in hits:
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vt = h - 8
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print(" candidate vtable %#x (slot+8 = deser)" % vt)
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for i in range(0, 0x60, 8):
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t = qword(vt + i)
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fn = fm.getFunctionAt(addr(t)) if 0x180000000 <= t < 0x181000000 else None
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print(" +%#04x -> %#x %s" % (i, t, fn.getName() if fn else ""))
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for frm, typ, fn, ent in xrefs_to(vt):
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print(" vtable xref from %#x in %s @ %#x" % (frm, fn, ent))
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print("\n### callers of FUN_180017390 (second caller of the 0x4e0 count setter)")
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for frm, typ, fn, ent in xrefs_to(0x180017390):
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print(" from %#x (%s) in %s @ %#x" % (frm, typ, fn, ent))
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print("\n### FUN_180199cc0 (raises 0x273d)")
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s = dec(0x180199cc0, 300)
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print(s)
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open(os.path.join(OUT, "dec_fn_180199cc0.c"), "w").write(s)
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for a, nm in ((0x18010cdc0, "writer2_18010cdc0"), (0x18007e7f0, "evt_18007e7f0"),
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(0x1800b3900, "evt_1800b3900")):
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s = dec(a, 300)
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open(os.path.join(OUT, "dec_%s.c" % nm), "w").write(s)
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print("\n### %s len=%d -> file" % (nm, len(s)))
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except Exception:
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traceback.print_exc()
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