funman300
edab23f04a
Emulates FIFA 17's full online + Ultimate Team stack against an offline,
clean-room backend (no EA servers). Proven end-to-end 2026-08-01:
Origin login -> Blaze login -> device-trust -> the FUT hub.
Package:
- tools/openfut-fut.sh one-command orchestrator (start/stop/status/restart)
- tools/root_arm.sh idempotent host arm (sysctls, DNAT, /etc/hosts easw)
- tools/{lsx_responder_v2,blaze_responder_v3b,roster_server,utas_server,autopatch}.py
the 5 servers (Origin LSX :4216, Blaze :42127/42130/42131, roster :8081,
FUT/UTAS :8099) + heat2.py (Fire2/Heat2 TDF codec)
- FUT-RUNBOOK.md runbook + gate-ladder troubleshooting
- docs/, tools/login_dump/*.md the reverse-engineering write-ups
All findings are clean-room, from binaries we own; nothing from any leak.
The wire protocol maps 1:1 to FIFA 23.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PN5bmpDVQR1aXgefyWAt7o
54 lines
3.9 KiB
Markdown
54 lines
3.9 KiB
Markdown
# Agent brief — reverse the FIFA17 OSDK_UNDERAGE_ERROR (Origin error 0xa2000012) (clean-room)
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## Clean-room rule (HARD)
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Derive ONLY from decrypted dumps here + live /proc/PID/mem (`pgrep -x FIFA17.exe`, live 39211) +
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our LSX/Blaze logs. NEVER leaked EA source.
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## Where we are (this session's WIN)
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The recipient-echo fix (lsx_responder_v2.py: response `sender` must byte-equal request `recipient`)
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CASCADED the whole Origin login chain. Live-confirmed NATURAL (no forging): OriginSDK(*[0x144b7c7a0])
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+0x3a0/+0x3a8 = 0x1f89493 (default user set), FIFA issued GetAuthCode ×3 on its own (FIFA17PC +
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FIFA17PC-SERVER), SetPresence flowing ("In Menus"). The OSDK login state machine advanced
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OSDK_INVALID_USER → **OSDK_UNDERAGE_ERROR**. On screen: "not eligible to use EA's online features due
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to an age restriction". Blaze login (1/0x0A) still 0 — this age gate blocks before it.
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## The exact gate
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OSDK classifier **0x14717d5d0** (dump osdk_classifier_14717d5d0.bin.asm): reads the OSDK/Ebisu
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manager's cached "last error" and maps it:
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`cmp eax,0xa2000003 -> OSDK_INVALID_USER` (we cleared this — user now valid)
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`cmp eax,0xa2000012 -> OSDK_UNDERAGE_ERROR` (the CURRENT error) <-- the target
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The error code comes from the manager chain: manager `*[0x144b86bf8]` = live 0x43c46c70,
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vptr **0x143959168**; classifier does `mov rcx,[0x144b86bf8]; mov rax,[rcx]; call [rax+0x60]` (=
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**0x14719b1b0**, dump mgr_vt60_14719b1b0.bin.asm) -> rsi (a sub-object); then `rsi->vt[0x68]()` ->
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the error code = 0xa2000012.
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## What is ALREADY RULED OUT (do not re-chase)
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- NOT from GetProfile: the IsUnderAge bool-parse (helper 0x14713ffa0: strconv result -> `setne al`,
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so "false"->0 = not-underage) stores our IsUnderAge="false" correctly. GetProfile deserializer
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0x147136140 reads only: UserId PersonaId Persona AvatarId Country IsUnderAge IsSubscriber
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GeoCountry CommerceCountry CommerceCurrency — no DOB/age field.
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- 0xa2000012 is NOT constructed by inline mov+lea/add arithmetic ANYWHERE in 0x146000000-0x1476f0000
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(scanned, 0 sites). So it is a DATA-TABLE value (scan DATA regions for the raw dword `12 00 00 a2`
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= an error-map table), or a value read from a Nucleus/HTTP/Blaze response, or a field.
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- Nucleus :42131 was NOT hit this boot (no live conn) and Blaze login=0 — so the underage was cached
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by an Origin/LSX operation during boot, before Blaze/Nucleus. (Confirm; don't assume.)
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## The questions to answer
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1. **Which sub-object does manager->vt[0x60] (0x14719b1b0) return, and where is its error field
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(read by vt[0x68]) WRITTEN with 0xa2000012?** Find the writer = the operation that decided underage.
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2. **What is 0xa2000012's source** — locate the raw dword in a data/error-map table (scan .rdata/.data
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for `12 00 00 a2`), find the code that selects it, and what INPUT maps to it (an HTTP/Nucleus status?
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a profile/account field? an entitlement? a hardcoded default when age is unverified?).
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3. **What CONDITION makes FIFA underage** despite IsUnderAge="false"? Trace back from the writer to the
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input we control (an LSX verb/field we answer wrong or omit, a Blaze reply, a missing DOB, an
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entitlement/age-rating check). We own every server endpoint FIFA talks to.
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4. **The fix**: concrete LSX/Blaze/Nucleus responder change (verb/field/value) that makes FIFA classify
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the user as an adult, so OSDK advances past OSDK_UNDERAGE_ERROR toward Blaze login.
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## Dumps / method
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osdk_classifier_14717d5d0, mgr_vt60_14719b1b0, getprofile_deser_147136140, boolparse_ffa0,
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authcode_impl_1470e67f0, sdk_connect_writer, + earlier auth/connect dumps. objdump Intel, VMA==runtime VA.
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Dump more live: `f.seek(va); f.read(n)` + objdump --adjust-vma. Data-dword scan: read region, `d.find(b'\x12\x00\x00\xa2')`.
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Every claim needs a VA/bytes/disasm/log line. We can WRITE /proc/mem too (A/B: poke a candidate field, watch
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OSDK state 0x43d189d8+0x80 [re-find via vptr 0x14395c180] leave "OSDK_UNDERAGE_ERROR").
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