funman300
21a81ad63c
Multi-agent pass over the store subsystem, 11 agents, findings run through three
adversarial verifiers. Full writeup in docs/plan-2026-08-05-store-subsystem.md.
THE REAL DISCARD TABLE IS RECOVERED. quick_sell() paid an invented rating tier
(600/300/150/50) that was wrong for every single card. The real table is
fcc_discardcoins in the client's own game DB, 141 rows keyed (cardtype, level, rare),
read out of the running client and verified 22/22 against live items:
value = round_half_up(rating * price / 100)
level = 3 if rating >= 75, 2 if 65..74, else 1 (0x180141e8a..0x180141ea3,
derived from rating, NOT a wire field)
cardtype = FUN_1800d8330(cardsubtypeid), decoded from its jump table and checked
across every subtype 0..599 with zero disagreements
A 94-rated gold rare is 752, not 600. A 76 rare is 608, not 150. A 55 bronze is 17,
not 50.
This also closes a disagreement nobody had noticed: the CLIENT already computes and
displays the correct value locally whenever our discardValue (atom 0xd7) is 0 or
absent. FUN_18013fe00 stores our value at item +0x38 and the guard at 0x180141025
skips the local computation when it is non-zero. So the screen has been showing the
real number while the server paid a made-up one, on every quick sell ever made.
Verified beyond what the report claimed, because a missing table row pays ZERO and
that would be a regression the old flat tier could not produce: across all 236 items
in the live profile, 230 map to cardtype 1 and 6 to cardtype 6, and NOT ONE would pay
0 coins. Table reproduces at 141 rows and the worked example lands exactly.
ZERO WIRE CHANGE, FUT_DISCARD_TABLE default off. Nothing new is sent; only the coin
figure the server credits moves. This is the patch worth defaulting on after one
in-game check, which is simply quick-selling a card and seeing the coins paid match
the value the card was already displaying.
THE GROUPING BUG IS NOT IN CARDSDLL, and the fix ranked first would have wasted a
launch. Live in the running client all three display groups own exactly the right
pack, there is exactly one copy of each pack record in 4 GiB, and nothing we send is
mis-parsed. The parsed model is correct and the Scaleform layer picks the wrong pack
when turning a tile click into a category id. displayGroupAssetId is served as 1/5/6
while the screen's category field reads 3, and group tiles carry a hardcoded
CATEGORY_ID of 0. Confirmed by direct read: ordinal 3, assetId 6, i.e. Premium, while
the last click was Gold.
The heap map that made this possible, all scoped to one pid: display-group vector
control block, 3 elements of 0x108; group record fields at +0x00 sortPriority,
+0x04 displayGroupAssetId, +0x40 a one-element pack vector; inner pack record 0x1a8
with packType at +0x38, ids at +0x70/+0xac, price at +0xa0, quantities at +0xc0..+0xd0.
extPrice SHOULD BE DELETED, not corrected. Both sub-parsers read only
externalPriceId; amount and currency are discarded. Sending the key at all creates an
"mtx" currency row that switches on a real-money price line the client can never fill
offline, which is the literal "or %1s" on every tile.
A WORRY NOBODY HAD RAISED, and I confirmed it from our own logs: the client has sent
packId 6 on every purchase it has ever made, four for four tonight and six for six
across history. We have never observed a successful buy of anything but Premium Gold.
Also settled: FUT_STORE_DISPLAYGROUP=0 is the right resting state, argued from
mechanism rather than from history; FUT_USERINFO=packs stays off because the
unopened-pack counter is client-mutable and the flag ladder silently drops squadList;
POST /user is a latent hard freeze that has never fired because the client never
issues that POST.
Honest coverage: the ActionScript layer is unread by everyone and every remaining
store mystery lives there.
Live: 439 contract checks pass, market suite passes, both flags off.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
58 lines
2.1 KiB
Python
58 lines
2.1 KiB
Python
"""DIMENSION 1 / query 7: who WRITES the store screen's selected-category field.
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FUN_18007dab0 reads *(int*)(screen+0x290) and hands it to FUN_1800147f0 as the
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group ordinal. FUN_18007dbd0 reads screen+0x294 as SERVER_ID and screen+0x298 as
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a callback string. Those three are set by whatever handles the incoming UI
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message.
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HYPOTHESIS: the writer copies a value straight out of the Flash message. If it
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copies the tile's ASSET_ID (displayGroupAssetId) rather than its CHILD_CATEGORY
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(the group ordinal), then non-contiguous displayGroupAssetId values break the
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drill-down, which is the reported bug.
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CONTROL: 0x294 and 0x298 are enumerated by the same scan. They are known to be
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read by FUN_18007dbd0, so if the scan cannot find their writers either, the scan
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is at fault rather than the code, and no absence claim is made.
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"""
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import traceback
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OUT = "/tmp/claude-1000/-home-alex-Documents-OpenFUT/8e521ca1-ca3e-4138-bb96-df1744dd1d30/scratchpad/store/q7_out.txt"
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buf = []
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def P(*a):
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s = " ".join(str(x) for x in a)
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buf.append(s)
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print(s)
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try:
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targets = (0x290, 0x294, 0x298, 0x2c8, 0x2cc)
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hits = {t: [] for t in targets}
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it = listing.getInstructions(True)
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n = 0
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while it.hasNext():
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ins = it.next()
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n += 1
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txt = str(ins)
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for i in range(ins.getNumOperands()):
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for o in ins.getOpObjects(i):
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try:
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v = int(o.getValue())
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except Exception:
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continue
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if v in targets:
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f = fm.getFunctionContaining(ins.getAddress())
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hits[v].append((int(ins.getAddress().getOffset()),
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f.getName() if f else "?", txt))
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P("instructions scanned:", n)
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for t in targets:
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P("")
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P("=" * 70)
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P("displacement/immediate %#x : %d instruction(s)" % (t, len(hits[t])))
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P("=" * 70)
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for a, fn, txt in hits[t]:
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P(" %-12s %-28s %s" % (hex(a), fn, txt))
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except Exception:
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P(traceback.format_exc())
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open(OUT, "w").write("\n".join(buf))
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print("WROTE", OUT)
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