Files
Ferrous-Solitaire/solitaire_data/src/auth_tokens.rs
T
funman300 9299176b2d refactor(android): forbid unsafe workspace-wide, quarantine JNI in app (#91)
Addresses #91: the #90 posture (`deny(unsafe_code)` + three scattered
`#![allow(unsafe_code)]` across solitaire_data and solitaire_engine) punched
unsafe holes into otherwise-pure logic crates. Replace it by *reducing* the
unsafe rather than relocating it, then forbidding it everywhere it can be
forbidden.

Changes:
- solitaire_data: new safe `android_jni` bridge owning the cached `JavaVM`
  and activity `GlobalRef`; exposes `with_env` / `with_activity_env` so
  keystore/clipboard/safe-area never touch a raw handle.
- keystore: drop the `JavaVM::from_raw` init path (now in the app) and
  replace the three `unsafe { JByteArray::from_raw(x.into_raw()) }` casts
  with the safe `JByteArray::from(JObject)` conversion jni 0.21 provides.
- engine clipboard + safe_area: route through the bridge; remove their
  `#![allow(unsafe_code)]` and all `from_raw` calls.
- solitaire_app: becomes the single owner of FFI unsafe. `android_main`
  reconstructs the raw `JavaVM` / activity once (it must, as the cdylib that
  exports `#[unsafe(no_mangle)]`) and registers the safe wrappers. It opts to
  its own `deny`-level lints with two scoped `#[allow(unsafe_code)]`.
- workspace: `unsafe_code` is now `forbid`. Every crate except the app entry
  point is fully unsafe-free.

Net: 7 unsafe sites across three crates collapse to 3 at the OS boundary in
one crate. Verified with host `clippy --workspace -- -D warnings` and an
`aarch64-linux-android` clippy build of solitaire_app (transitively engine +
data); also fixed two latent android-only `collapsible_if` warnings surfaced
in the keystore by the cross-target check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-22 11:32:26 -07:00

159 lines
5.9 KiB
Rust

//! Secure storage for JWT access and refresh tokens using the OS keychain.
//!
//! Tokens are stored under service name `"ferrous_solitaire_server"` with entry
//! keys `"{username}_access"` and `"{username}_refresh"`.
//!
//! On Linux this requires a running secret service (GNOME Keyring / KWallet).
//! If the keychain is unavailable, operations return
//! [`TokenError::KeychainUnavailable`] — callers should fall back to prompting
//! the user to log in again.
//!
//! Before calling any function in this module the application must initialise
//! the default keyring store exactly once at startup by calling
//! `keyring::use_native_store` (e.g. in `solitaire_app::main` before building
//! the Bevy `App`). If no default store is set, all operations in this module
//! will return [`TokenError::KeychainUnavailable`].
//!
//! # Android
//!
//! `keyring-core` cannot compile for the android target (its `rpassword`
//! transitive dep uses `libc::__errno_location`, which Android's bionic
//! doesn't expose). On Android this module delegates to an Android Keystore
//! JNI backend. `solitaire_app` must initialise the safe
//! [`crate::android_jni`] bridge (via `set_jvm` / `set_activity`) from Android
//! startup before token operations can succeed.
//!
//! # Note: no unit tests — requires live OS keychain.
#[cfg(not(target_os = "android"))]
use keyring_core::Entry;
use thiserror::Error;
/// Errors that can occur when reading or writing tokens in the OS keychain.
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum TokenError {
/// The OS keychain (secret service / keychain daemon) is not available.
#[error("keychain unavailable: {0}")]
KeychainUnavailable(String),
/// No token was found in the keychain for the given username.
#[error("token not found for user {0}")]
NotFound(String),
/// An unexpected keychain error occurred.
#[error("keychain error: {0}")]
Keyring(String),
}
/// Service name used to namespace all keychain entries for this application.
#[cfg(not(target_os = "android"))]
const SERVICE: &str = "ferrous_solitaire_server";
/// Map a `keyring_core::Error` to the appropriate `TokenError`.
#[cfg(not(target_os = "android"))]
fn map_keyring_err(err: keyring_core::Error, username: &str) -> TokenError {
let msg = err.to_string();
match err {
keyring_core::Error::NoStorageAccess(_) | keyring_core::Error::NoDefaultStore => {
TokenError::KeychainUnavailable(msg)
}
keyring_core::Error::NoEntry => TokenError::NotFound(username.to_string()),
_ => TokenError::Keyring(msg),
}
}
/// Store the access and refresh tokens for `username` in the OS keychain.
///
/// Any previously stored tokens for that username are overwritten.
#[cfg(not(target_os = "android"))]
pub fn store_tokens(
username: &str,
access_token: &str,
refresh_token: &str,
) -> Result<(), TokenError> {
Entry::new(SERVICE, &format!("{username}_access"))
.map_err(|e| map_keyring_err(e, username))?
.set_password(access_token)
.map_err(|e| map_keyring_err(e, username))?;
Entry::new(SERVICE, &format!("{username}_refresh"))
.map_err(|e| map_keyring_err(e, username))?
.set_password(refresh_token)
.map_err(|e| map_keyring_err(e, username))?;
Ok(())
}
/// Load the stored access token for `username` from the OS keychain.
///
/// Returns [`TokenError::NotFound`] if no token has been stored yet.
#[cfg(not(target_os = "android"))]
pub fn load_access_token(username: &str) -> Result<String, TokenError> {
Entry::new(SERVICE, &format!("{username}_access"))
.map_err(|e| map_keyring_err(e, username))?
.get_password()
.map_err(|e| map_keyring_err(e, username))
}
/// Load the stored refresh token for `username` from the OS keychain.
///
/// Returns [`TokenError::NotFound`] if no token has been stored yet.
#[cfg(not(target_os = "android"))]
pub fn load_refresh_token(username: &str) -> Result<String, TokenError> {
Entry::new(SERVICE, &format!("{username}_refresh"))
.map_err(|e| map_keyring_err(e, username))?
.get_password()
.map_err(|e| map_keyring_err(e, username))
}
/// Delete the stored access and refresh tokens for `username`.
///
/// Intended to be called on logout or account deletion. Missing entries are
/// silently ignored (the tokens are already gone, which is the desired state).
#[cfg(not(target_os = "android"))]
pub fn delete_tokens(username: &str) -> Result<(), TokenError> {
match Entry::new(SERVICE, &format!("{username}_access"))
.map_err(|e| map_keyring_err(e, username))?
.delete_credential()
{
Ok(()) | Err(keyring_core::Error::NoEntry) => {}
Err(e) => return Err(map_keyring_err(e, username)),
}
match Entry::new(SERVICE, &format!("{username}_refresh"))
.map_err(|e| map_keyring_err(e, username))?
.delete_credential()
{
Ok(()) | Err(keyring_core::Error::NoEntry) => {}
Err(e) => return Err(map_keyring_err(e, username)),
}
Ok(())
}
// -------------------------------------------------------------------
// Android — delegate to the JNI Keystore bridge in android_keystore.
// -------------------------------------------------------------------
#[cfg(target_os = "android")]
pub fn store_tokens(
username: &str,
access_token: &str,
refresh_token: &str,
) -> Result<(), TokenError> {
crate::android_keystore::store_tokens(username, access_token, refresh_token)
}
#[cfg(target_os = "android")]
pub fn load_access_token(username: &str) -> Result<String, TokenError> {
crate::android_keystore::load_access_token(username)
}
#[cfg(target_os = "android")]
pub fn load_refresh_token(username: &str) -> Result<String, TokenError> {
crate::android_keystore::load_refresh_token(username)
}
#[cfg(target_os = "android")]
pub fn delete_tokens(username: &str) -> Result<(), TokenError> {
crate::android_keystore::delete_tokens(username)
}