refactor(android): forbid unsafe workspace-wide, quarantine JNI in app (#91)

Addresses #91: the #90 posture (`deny(unsafe_code)` + three scattered
`#![allow(unsafe_code)]` across solitaire_data and solitaire_engine) punched
unsafe holes into otherwise-pure logic crates. Replace it by *reducing* the
unsafe rather than relocating it, then forbidding it everywhere it can be
forbidden.

Changes:
- solitaire_data: new safe `android_jni` bridge owning the cached `JavaVM`
  and activity `GlobalRef`; exposes `with_env` / `with_activity_env` so
  keystore/clipboard/safe-area never touch a raw handle.
- keystore: drop the `JavaVM::from_raw` init path (now in the app) and
  replace the three `unsafe { JByteArray::from_raw(x.into_raw()) }` casts
  with the safe `JByteArray::from(JObject)` conversion jni 0.21 provides.
- engine clipboard + safe_area: route through the bridge; remove their
  `#![allow(unsafe_code)]` and all `from_raw` calls.
- solitaire_app: becomes the single owner of FFI unsafe. `android_main`
  reconstructs the raw `JavaVM` / activity once (it must, as the cdylib that
  exports `#[unsafe(no_mangle)]`) and registers the safe wrappers. It opts to
  its own `deny`-level lints with two scoped `#[allow(unsafe_code)]`.
- workspace: `unsafe_code` is now `forbid`. Every crate except the app entry
  point is fully unsafe-free.

Net: 7 unsafe sites across three crates collapse to 3 at the OS boundary in
one crate. Verified with host `clippy --workspace -- -D warnings` and an
`aarch64-linux-android` clippy build of solitaire_app (transitively engine +
data); also fixed two latent android-only `collapsible_if` warnings surfaced
in the keystore by the cross-target check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
funman300
2026-06-22 11:32:26 -07:00
parent 6a9352cde1
commit 9299176b2d
10 changed files with 190 additions and 146 deletions
+4 -28
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,5 @@
//! Safe-area insets.
//!
// JNI FFI (Android only) requires `unsafe` to reconstruct `JavaVM` /
// `JObject` handles from raw pointers handed over by the runtime. Scoped to
// this module so the rest of the workspace stays `deny(unsafe_code)`.
#![allow(unsafe_code)]
//!
//! Reports the OS-reserved regions around the playable surface (status
//! bar at the top, gesture / navigation bar at the bottom on Android,
//! display cutouts, etc.) so UI anchored to a screen edge can avoid
@@ -296,30 +291,12 @@ mod android {
}
fn query_insets() -> Result<SafeAreaInsets, String> {
use bevy::android::ANDROID_APP;
use jni::{JavaVM, objects::JObject};
use solitaire_data::android_jni;
let app = ANDROID_APP
.get()
.ok_or_else(|| "ANDROID_APP not initialized".to_string())?;
// SAFETY: `vm_as_ptr()` returns the JavaVM* set up by the Android
// runtime; valid for the lifetime of the process.
let vm = unsafe { JavaVM::from_raw(app.vm_as_ptr().cast()) }
.map_err(|e| format!("JavaVM::from_raw: {e}"))?;
let mut env = vm
.attach_current_thread_permanently()
.map_err(|e| format!("attach_current_thread: {e}"))?;
// SAFETY: `activity_as_ptr()` returns the NativeActivity jobject
// pointer — valid for the lifetime of the process.
let activity = unsafe { JObject::from_raw(app.activity_as_ptr() as _) };
(|| -> jni::errors::Result<SafeAreaInsets> {
android_jni::with_activity_env(|env, activity| {
// Window window = activity.getWindow();
let window = env
.call_method(&activity, "getWindow", "()Landroid/view/Window;", &[])?
.call_method(activity, "getWindow", "()Landroid/view/Window;", &[])?
.l()?;
// View decor = window.getDecorView();
@@ -371,8 +348,7 @@ mod android {
left,
right,
})
})()
.map_err(|e| format!("safe-area JNI: {e}"))
})
}
}