refactor(android): forbid unsafe workspace-wide, quarantine JNI in app (#91)

Addresses #91: the #90 posture (`deny(unsafe_code)` + three scattered
`#![allow(unsafe_code)]` across solitaire_data and solitaire_engine) punched
unsafe holes into otherwise-pure logic crates. Replace it by *reducing* the
unsafe rather than relocating it, then forbidding it everywhere it can be
forbidden.

Changes:
- solitaire_data: new safe `android_jni` bridge owning the cached `JavaVM`
  and activity `GlobalRef`; exposes `with_env` / `with_activity_env` so
  keystore/clipboard/safe-area never touch a raw handle.
- keystore: drop the `JavaVM::from_raw` init path (now in the app) and
  replace the three `unsafe { JByteArray::from_raw(x.into_raw()) }` casts
  with the safe `JByteArray::from(JObject)` conversion jni 0.21 provides.
- engine clipboard + safe_area: route through the bridge; remove their
  `#![allow(unsafe_code)]` and all `from_raw` calls.
- solitaire_app: becomes the single owner of FFI unsafe. `android_main`
  reconstructs the raw `JavaVM` / activity once (it must, as the cdylib that
  exports `#[unsafe(no_mangle)]`) and registers the safe wrappers. It opts to
  its own `deny`-level lints with two scoped `#[allow(unsafe_code)]`.
- workspace: `unsafe_code` is now `forbid`. Every crate except the app entry
  point is fully unsafe-free.

Net: 7 unsafe sites across three crates collapse to 3 at the OS boundary in
one crate. Verified with host `clippy --workspace -- -D warnings` and an
`aarch64-linux-android` clippy build of solitaire_app (transitively engine +
data); also fixed two latent android-only `collapsible_if` warnings surfaced
in the keystore by the cross-target check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

solitaire_engine/src/android_clipboard.rs

@@ -1,42 +1,19 @@
-// JNI FFI requires `unsafe` to reconstruct `JavaVM` / `JObject` handles from
-// raw pointers handed over by the Android runtime. Scoped to this module so
-// the rest of the workspace stays `deny(unsafe_code)`.
-#![allow(unsafe_code)]
-
 /// Android clipboard bridge via JNI.
 ///
 /// Writes text to the system clipboard by calling into `ClipboardManager`
-/// through the JNI. Only compiled and linked on `target_os = "android"`.
+/// through the safe [`solitaire_data::android_jni`] bridge. Only compiled and
+/// linked on `target_os = "android"`.
 #[cfg(target_os = "android")]
 pub fn set_text(text: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
-    use bevy::android::ANDROID_APP;
-    use jni::{
-        JavaVM,
-        objects::{JObject, JValueOwned},
-    };
+    use jni::objects::JValueOwned;
+    use solitaire_data::android_jni;
 
-    let app = ANDROID_APP
-        .get()
-        .ok_or_else(|| "ANDROID_APP not initialized".to_string())?;
-
-    // SAFETY: vm_as_ptr() returns the raw JavaVM* set up by the Android runtime.
-    let vm = unsafe { JavaVM::from_raw(app.vm_as_ptr().cast()) }
-        .map_err(|e| format!("JavaVM::from_raw: {e}"))?;
-
-    let mut env = vm
-        .attach_current_thread_permanently()
-        .map_err(|e| format!("attach_current_thread: {e}"))?;
-
-    // SAFETY: activity_as_ptr() is the NativeActivity jobject pointer —
-    // valid for the lifetime of the process.
-    let activity = unsafe { JObject::from_raw(app.activity_as_ptr() as _) };
-
-    (|| -> jni::errors::Result<()> {
+    android_jni::with_activity_env(|env, activity| {
         // ClipboardManager cm = activity.getSystemService("clipboard")
         let svc_name = JValueOwned::from(env.new_string("clipboard")?);
         let cm = env
             .call_method(
-                &activity,
+                activity,
                 "getSystemService",
                 "(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/Object;",
                 &[svc_name.borrow()],
@@ -65,6 +42,5 @@ pub fn set_text(text: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
             &[clip_val.borrow()],
         )?
         .v()
-    })()
-    .map_err(|e| format!("clipboard JNI: {e}"))
+    })
 }