21a81ad63c
Multi-agent pass over the store subsystem, 11 agents, findings run through three
adversarial verifiers. Full writeup in docs/plan-2026-08-05-store-subsystem.md.
THE REAL DISCARD TABLE IS RECOVERED. quick_sell() paid an invented rating tier
(600/300/150/50) that was wrong for every single card. The real table is
fcc_discardcoins in the client's own game DB, 141 rows keyed (cardtype, level, rare),
read out of the running client and verified 22/22 against live items:
value = round_half_up(rating * price / 100)
level = 3 if rating >= 75, 2 if 65..74, else 1 (0x180141e8a..0x180141ea3,
derived from rating, NOT a wire field)
cardtype = FUN_1800d8330(cardsubtypeid), decoded from its jump table and checked
across every subtype 0..599 with zero disagreements
A 94-rated gold rare is 752, not 600. A 76 rare is 608, not 150. A 55 bronze is 17,
not 50.
This also closes a disagreement nobody had noticed: the CLIENT already computes and
displays the correct value locally whenever our discardValue (atom 0xd7) is 0 or
absent. FUN_18013fe00 stores our value at item +0x38 and the guard at 0x180141025
skips the local computation when it is non-zero. So the screen has been showing the
real number while the server paid a made-up one, on every quick sell ever made.
Verified beyond what the report claimed, because a missing table row pays ZERO and
that would be a regression the old flat tier could not produce: across all 236 items
in the live profile, 230 map to cardtype 1 and 6 to cardtype 6, and NOT ONE would pay
0 coins. Table reproduces at 141 rows and the worked example lands exactly.
ZERO WIRE CHANGE, FUT_DISCARD_TABLE default off. Nothing new is sent; only the coin
figure the server credits moves. This is the patch worth defaulting on after one
in-game check, which is simply quick-selling a card and seeing the coins paid match
the value the card was already displaying.
THE GROUPING BUG IS NOT IN CARDSDLL, and the fix ranked first would have wasted a
launch. Live in the running client all three display groups own exactly the right
pack, there is exactly one copy of each pack record in 4 GiB, and nothing we send is
mis-parsed. The parsed model is correct and the Scaleform layer picks the wrong pack
when turning a tile click into a category id. displayGroupAssetId is served as 1/5/6
while the screen's category field reads 3, and group tiles carry a hardcoded
CATEGORY_ID of 0. Confirmed by direct read: ordinal 3, assetId 6, i.e. Premium, while
the last click was Gold.
The heap map that made this possible, all scoped to one pid: display-group vector
control block, 3 elements of 0x108; group record fields at +0x00 sortPriority,
+0x04 displayGroupAssetId, +0x40 a one-element pack vector; inner pack record 0x1a8
with packType at +0x38, ids at +0x70/+0xac, price at +0xa0, quantities at +0xc0..+0xd0.
extPrice SHOULD BE DELETED, not corrected. Both sub-parsers read only
externalPriceId; amount and currency are discarded. Sending the key at all creates an
"mtx" currency row that switches on a real-money price line the client can never fill
offline, which is the literal "or %1s" on every tile.
A WORRY NOBODY HAD RAISED, and I confirmed it from our own logs: the client has sent
packId 6 on every purchase it has ever made, four for four tonight and six for six
across history. We have never observed a successful buy of anything but Premium Gold.
Also settled: FUT_STORE_DISPLAYGROUP=0 is the right resting state, argued from
mechanism rather than from history; FUT_USERINFO=packs stays off because the
unopened-pack counter is client-mutable and the flag ladder silently drops squadList;
POST /user is a latent hard freeze that has never fired because the client never
issues that POST.
Honest coverage: the ActionScript layer is unread by everyone and every remaining
store mystery lives there.
Live: 439 contract checks pass, market suite passes, both flags off.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
61 lines
2.2 KiB
Python
61 lines
2.2 KiB
Python
"""DIMENSION 4, pass 11: decode the request on the not-duplicate branch.
|
|
|
|
From FUN_18016c730 (the generic dispatcher) the payload object's vtable slots
|
|
are: +0x08 = header/url contributor, +0x10 = body serializer. For the object
|
|
built in FUN_18009bc40 the vtable is 0x1801f3158, so
|
|
body serializer = 0x180127cc0
|
|
header/url = 0x180122420
|
|
Decompile both. The body serializer's FUN_180180cd0(<atom>) calls name the
|
|
request's keys, which is exactly what dimension 4 needs.
|
|
|
|
Also decompile the five OTHER builders that instantiate the same vtable
|
|
(FUN_1800db920, FUN_1800dbb90, FUN_1800dcad0, FUN_1800363e0, FUN_1800366f0):
|
|
comparing the int they store at record+0x08 (our site stores 7) decodes that
|
|
enum.
|
|
|
|
CONTROL: FUN_180126440 is the already-established PurchaseItems request
|
|
serializer; decompile it too so the "what a request serializer looks like"
|
|
reading is anchored on a known case.
|
|
"""
|
|
import traceback
|
|
|
|
OUT = "/tmp/claude-1000/-home-alex-Documents-OpenFUT/8e521ca1-ca3e-4138-bb96-df1744dd1d30/scratchpad/store/dup11_out.txt"
|
|
|
|
def w(fh, s=""):
|
|
fh.write(str(s) + "\n")
|
|
|
|
def dump(fh, a, label):
|
|
s = dec(a)
|
|
w(fh, "")
|
|
w(fh, "#" * 70)
|
|
w(fh, "# %s %#x len(src)=%d FULL" % (label, a, len(s)))
|
|
w(fh, "#" * 70)
|
|
w(fh, s)
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
fh = open(OUT, "w")
|
|
dump(fh, 0x180127CC0, "BODY SERIALIZER vt+0x10 of the not-duplicate request")
|
|
dump(fh, 0x180122420, "header/url contributor vt+0x08")
|
|
dump(fh, 0x180129200, "vt+0x38 of the same vtable")
|
|
for a in (0x1800DB920, 0x1800DBB90, 0x1800DCAD0, 0x1800363E0, 0x1800366F0):
|
|
dump(fh, a, "sibling builder using vtable 0x1801f3158")
|
|
dump(fh, 0x180126440, "CONTROL: PurchaseItems request serializer")
|
|
|
|
w(fh, "")
|
|
w(fh, "=== raw disassembly of FUN_1801180a0 (manager vt+0xc0) ===")
|
|
try:
|
|
flat.disassemble(addr(0x1801180A0))
|
|
flat.createFunction(addr(0x1801180A0), None)
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
w(fh, "createFunction: %s" % e)
|
|
f = func(0x1801180A0)
|
|
it = listing.getInstructions(f.getBody(), True)
|
|
while it.hasNext():
|
|
i = it.next()
|
|
w(fh, " %s %s" % (i.getAddress(), i))
|
|
|
|
fh.close()
|
|
print("WROTE", OUT)
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
traceback.print_exc()
|