funman300
21a81ad63c
Multi-agent pass over the store subsystem, 11 agents, findings run through three
adversarial verifiers. Full writeup in docs/plan-2026-08-05-store-subsystem.md.
THE REAL DISCARD TABLE IS RECOVERED. quick_sell() paid an invented rating tier
(600/300/150/50) that was wrong for every single card. The real table is
fcc_discardcoins in the client's own game DB, 141 rows keyed (cardtype, level, rare),
read out of the running client and verified 22/22 against live items:
value = round_half_up(rating * price / 100)
level = 3 if rating >= 75, 2 if 65..74, else 1 (0x180141e8a..0x180141ea3,
derived from rating, NOT a wire field)
cardtype = FUN_1800d8330(cardsubtypeid), decoded from its jump table and checked
across every subtype 0..599 with zero disagreements
A 94-rated gold rare is 752, not 600. A 76 rare is 608, not 150. A 55 bronze is 17,
not 50.
This also closes a disagreement nobody had noticed: the CLIENT already computes and
displays the correct value locally whenever our discardValue (atom 0xd7) is 0 or
absent. FUN_18013fe00 stores our value at item +0x38 and the guard at 0x180141025
skips the local computation when it is non-zero. So the screen has been showing the
real number while the server paid a made-up one, on every quick sell ever made.
Verified beyond what the report claimed, because a missing table row pays ZERO and
that would be a regression the old flat tier could not produce: across all 236 items
in the live profile, 230 map to cardtype 1 and 6 to cardtype 6, and NOT ONE would pay
0 coins. Table reproduces at 141 rows and the worked example lands exactly.
ZERO WIRE CHANGE, FUT_DISCARD_TABLE default off. Nothing new is sent; only the coin
figure the server credits moves. This is the patch worth defaulting on after one
in-game check, which is simply quick-selling a card and seeing the coins paid match
the value the card was already displaying.
THE GROUPING BUG IS NOT IN CARDSDLL, and the fix ranked first would have wasted a
launch. Live in the running client all three display groups own exactly the right
pack, there is exactly one copy of each pack record in 4 GiB, and nothing we send is
mis-parsed. The parsed model is correct and the Scaleform layer picks the wrong pack
when turning a tile click into a category id. displayGroupAssetId is served as 1/5/6
while the screen's category field reads 3, and group tiles carry a hardcoded
CATEGORY_ID of 0. Confirmed by direct read: ordinal 3, assetId 6, i.e. Premium, while
the last click was Gold.
The heap map that made this possible, all scoped to one pid: display-group vector
control block, 3 elements of 0x108; group record fields at +0x00 sortPriority,
+0x04 displayGroupAssetId, +0x40 a one-element pack vector; inner pack record 0x1a8
with packType at +0x38, ids at +0x70/+0xac, price at +0xa0, quantities at +0xc0..+0xd0.
extPrice SHOULD BE DELETED, not corrected. Both sub-parsers read only
externalPriceId; amount and currency are discarded. Sending the key at all creates an
"mtx" currency row that switches on a real-money price line the client can never fill
offline, which is the literal "or %1s" on every tile.
A WORRY NOBODY HAD RAISED, and I confirmed it from our own logs: the client has sent
packId 6 on every purchase it has ever made, four for four tonight and six for six
across history. We have never observed a successful buy of anything but Premium Gold.
Also settled: FUT_STORE_DISPLAYGROUP=0 is the right resting state, argued from
mechanism rather than from history; FUT_USERINFO=packs stays off because the
unopened-pack counter is client-mutable and the flag ladder silently drops squadList;
POST /user is a latent hard freeze that has never fired because the client never
issues that POST.
Honest coverage: the ActionScript layer is unread by everyone and every remaining
store mystery lives there.
Live: 439 contract checks pass, market suite passes, both flags off.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
90 lines
3.6 KiB
Python
90 lines
3.6 KiB
Python
"""D2 QUICK SELL, batch 9: the wallet. Q2 assign-vs-add, final attempt.
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PLAN. Find the credit-carrying response classes and their deserialisers:
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RS4:FutUserCreditsServerResponse @ 0x18021dc18
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RS4:FutUpdateCreditsServerResponse @ 0x18022cc10
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RS4:FutDiscardCardServerResponse @ 0x180220540 (vtable 0x180220488, deser 0x180127300)
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Resolve each by find_all(b"RS4:"+name) then xrefs_to(hit-4) -> factory -> the
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.rdata vtable it installs -> slot +0x08. Decompile all three deserialisers and
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every virtual they invoke on the FUT manager singleton, so the wallet field and
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its writers are visible. Then enumerate every writer of that field.
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CONTROL: the discard chain must resolve to 0x180127300, which is already known
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independently (qword 0x180127300 sits at 0x180220490 = vtable+0x08). If the same
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mechanism yields a plausible deser for the two credits classes, it is working.
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"""
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import traceback, os, struct
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OUT = "/tmp/claude-1000/-home-alex-Documents-OpenFUT/8e521ca1-ca3e-4138-bb96-df1744dd1d30/scratchpad/store/qs/"
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def dump(tag, va, path=None):
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try:
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src = dec(va)
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except Exception as e:
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src = "// threw %r" % (e,)
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print("=" * 78)
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print("%s %#x fname=%s len(src)=%d (FULL)" % (tag, va, fname(va), len(src)))
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print("=" * 78)
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print(src)
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if path:
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open(OUT + path, "w").write(src)
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return src
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def resolve(name):
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out = []
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for h in find_all(b"RS4:" + name.encode() + b"\x00"):
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for frm, typ, fn, ent in xrefs_to(h - 4):
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if ent:
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out.append((h, frm, ent, fn))
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return out
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try:
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for nm in ("FutDiscardCardServerResponse", "FutUserCreditsServerResponse",
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"FutUpdateCreditsServerResponse"):
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print("##### %s #####" % nm)
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for h, frm, ent, fn in resolve(nm):
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print(" literal %#x factory %#x %s (ref at %#x)" % (h, ent, fn, frm))
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src = dump("factory", ent, "qs_r_fac_%x.txt" % ent)
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# find the PTR_FUN_ vtable it installs
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import re
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for m in re.finditer(r"PTR_FUN_([0-9a-f]+)", src):
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vt = int(m.group(1), 16)
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print(" vtable %#x, slot+0x08 = %#x %s"
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% (vt, qword(vt + 8), fname(qword(vt + 8))))
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dump("deser", qword(vt + 8), "qs_r_deser_%x.txt" % qword(vt + 8))
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for off, tgt, fnm in vtable(vt, 24):
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print(" +%#05x %#x %s" % (off, tgt, fnm))
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print()
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print("##### the FUT manager slots used by the discard deser #####")
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# the deser calls (**(code**)(*plVar4 + 0xa30))(plVar4, id) after parsing an id
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# find every function that calls a virtual at +0xa30 / +0xa08 / +0xa48 and the
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# ones that call slots near them, so a credit setter can be spotted by name.
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it = fm.getFunctions(True)
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want = ("0xa08", "0xa30", "0xa48", "0x9f8", "0xa00", "0xa10", "0xa18", "0xa20",
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"0xa28", "0xa38", "0xa40", "0xa50", "0xa58", "0xa60")
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tally = {}
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while it.hasNext():
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f = it.next()
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ii = listing.getInstructions(f.getBody(), True)
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got = []
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while ii.hasNext():
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i = ii.next()
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t = str(i)
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if t.startswith("CALL qword ptr [") and any(w in t for w in want):
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got.append((int(i.getAddress().getOffset()), t))
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if got:
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tally[int(f.getEntryPoint().getOffset())] = (f.getName(), got)
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print(" %d functions call one of those slots" % len(tally))
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for e in sorted(tally):
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nm, got = tally[e]
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print(" %#x %s" % (e, nm))
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for a, t in got:
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print(" %#x %s" % (a, t))
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except Exception:
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traceback.print_exc()
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