funman300
43557989f5
The subsystem that was fully greyed-out this morning now lists a card on the transfer
market: price screen, Submit, "your item is now up for trade", TRANSFER LIST 0/100,
auctionCount 1, and STORE.listings() holds the auction. Every step verified at the
instruction level first, then confirmed live. Three fixes, all behind flags, all off by
default until this run proved them.
1. WE WERE BANNING OUR OWN TRADING. userInfo.feature (atom 0x11c) is a RESTRICTION map,
not a grant; we sent feature={"trade":true}, which is a trade BAN. Verified in
q_feature_trade.py: FUN_18013ec10 parses feature/trade into userInfo+0x17c, and at
the massinfo END_OBJECT the client runs
cmp byte [rsi+0x17c],0 / jz skip / mov dword [rsi+0x50],0
feeding applier 0x18011dc91 -> IS_TRADING_ENABLED (model+0x1fd2e) = 0. It runs LAST
and unconditionally, which is why the gate read 0 all day regardless of /settings or
the Blaze config store. FUT_TRADING sends feature={} instead. Live: gate flipped
0 -> 1 on UT re-entry (model rebuilt, pointer changed, byte read 1).
2. TRANSFER LIST CAPACITY 0/0. pileSizeClientData (massinfo atom 0x227, parser
0x18013adb0) is the capacity, NOT the "MY CLUB counter" the old comment claimed.
Verified in q_pilesize_keys.py: exactly two storing arms, key 2 -> model+0x1fd1c
(TRADE_PILE_SIZE) and key 4 -> +0x1fd20 (watch list), every other key SKIP'd. The old
code would have sprayed the 246 club count into the capacity. FUT_PILESIZES sends
key 2 = 100, key 4 = 50. Live: capacity read 0 -> 100, header showed 0/100.
3. THE PRICE SCREEN FROZE THE CLIENT. GET marketdata/pricelimits was answered with an
OBJECT {minPrice,maxPrice}; the deser 0x180163ee0 reads a BARE TOP-LEVEL ARRAY
(root loop while tok != 0xd), so object-where-array desynced the SAX reader into the
0x1801c7f1a busy loop (confirmed live: utime climbing 227 ticks/s, core pinned).
Verified in q_pricelimits.py: element fields defId 0xcf, maxPrice 0x1c2, minPrice
0x1ca, all scalar ints. marketdata_route now returns a bare array, one element per
requested defId. Live: price screen opened and Submit succeeded.
Corrected along the way, all now in the code: two prior "trading root causes" from
earlier today were wrong (the Blaze IS_TRADING_ENABLED keys are output-only names, and
the applier is a virtual method at vtable+0x988, not unreachable). Those refutations are
recorded in blaze_responder_v3b.py and the doc.
Also lands the transfer-market recon doc (plan-2026-08-06-transfer-market.md) and the
market Ghidra query set.
Server-authoritative economy note: the 5% transfer fee and the price bands (currently a
150..15000 placeholder per defId) are not yet real; that is refinement, not a freeze.
The live-auction market SCREEN ("List on Transfer Market" browse) is a separate surface
still to do (P4 auction-counts route, P5 empty market bodies).
Live: 439 contract checks pass. Card listed and persisted, auctionCount 1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
66 lines
3.0 KiB
Python
66 lines
3.0 KiB
Python
"""THE DECISIVE ONE. Does FUN_180173e00 actually run, or is every gate byte a
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constructor default?
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WHY IT DECIDES MY RECOMMENDATION: FUN_180173e00 calls the gate applier (vt+0x988)
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and the CAPACITY applier (vt+0x998) in the SAME branch, after the same two guards.
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They run together or not at all. If the callback never runs, serving
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pileSizeClientData cannot possibly move TRANSFER LIST capacity and my recommendation
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is void.
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THE OBSERVATION THAT FORCES THE QUESTION (live, this session, controls passed):
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model+0x1fd2f..+0x1fd3f all read 1, and FUN_18011dc50 writes every one of them as
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`byte = (respField == 1)`. We serve {"configs": []}, so if the response struct were
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zero-initialised and the applier ran, they would ALL be 0. They are 1. So exactly one
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of these is true:
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(A) the applier never runs and those bytes are FutDataManagerImpl ctor defaults
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(B) the applier runs and the RESPONSE struct is constructed with 1s
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(A) and (B) predict opposite outcomes for serving pileSizeClientData, and the live
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byte pattern alone cannot separate them. The response constructor can.
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TEST: decompile the FutGetUserMassInfoServerResponse constructor and read the
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initialiser for resp+0x28..+0xc4 (the settings block), resp+0x50 (tradingEnabled),
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and resp+0xc8..+0xd4 (the capacity block).
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CONTROL inside the answer: whatever the ctor sets resp+0x80 (friendlySeasonsEnabled)
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to must equal the live model+0x1fd3a, which is 1. If the ctor sets it to 1, (B) is
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confirmed and the applier demonstrably runs. If the ctor zeroes it, (A) holds.
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"""
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import struct, traceback
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try:
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print("########## descriptor vtable slot +0x10 -> 0x18011f940 ##########")
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print(dec(0x18011f940, 300))
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except Exception:
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traceback.print_exc()
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try:
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# the ctor should reference the RS4 name 0x18022d110 (-4 rule: the lea points at
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# the "RS4:" header itself)
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print("\n\n########## refs to RS4:FutGetUserMassInfoServerResponse (0x18022d110) ##########")
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for frm, typ, fn, ent in xrefs_to(0x18022d110):
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print(" %#x %s in %s (%#x)" % (frm, typ, fn, ent))
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def sect(name):
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for b in mem.getBlocks():
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if b.getName() == name:
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return int(b.getStart().getOffset()), int(b.getEnd().getOffset()) - int(b.getStart().getOffset()) + 1
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TB, TS = sect(".text")
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TEXT = read_bytes(TB, TS)
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for tgt in (0x18022d110, 0x18022d000):
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out = []
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for i in range(0, len(TEXT) - 4):
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d = struct.unpack_from("<i", TEXT, i)[0]
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if TB + i + 4 + d == tgt:
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out.append(TB + i)
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print("\n rip-disp32 refs to %#x: %s" % (tgt, [hex(x) for x in out]))
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for a in out:
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f = fm.getFunctionContaining(addr(a))
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print(" %#x in %s" % (a, f.getName() if f else "?"))
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except Exception:
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traceback.print_exc()
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try:
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print("\n\n########## FUN_18016c330 (installs the descriptor / issues request) ##########")
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s = dec(0x18016c330, 300)
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print("len=%d" % len(s)); print(s)
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except Exception:
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traceback.print_exc()
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