21a81ad63c
Multi-agent pass over the store subsystem, 11 agents, findings run through three
adversarial verifiers. Full writeup in docs/plan-2026-08-05-store-subsystem.md.
THE REAL DISCARD TABLE IS RECOVERED. quick_sell() paid an invented rating tier
(600/300/150/50) that was wrong for every single card. The real table is
fcc_discardcoins in the client's own game DB, 141 rows keyed (cardtype, level, rare),
read out of the running client and verified 22/22 against live items:
value = round_half_up(rating * price / 100)
level = 3 if rating >= 75, 2 if 65..74, else 1 (0x180141e8a..0x180141ea3,
derived from rating, NOT a wire field)
cardtype = FUN_1800d8330(cardsubtypeid), decoded from its jump table and checked
across every subtype 0..599 with zero disagreements
A 94-rated gold rare is 752, not 600. A 76 rare is 608, not 150. A 55 bronze is 17,
not 50.
This also closes a disagreement nobody had noticed: the CLIENT already computes and
displays the correct value locally whenever our discardValue (atom 0xd7) is 0 or
absent. FUN_18013fe00 stores our value at item +0x38 and the guard at 0x180141025
skips the local computation when it is non-zero. So the screen has been showing the
real number while the server paid a made-up one, on every quick sell ever made.
Verified beyond what the report claimed, because a missing table row pays ZERO and
that would be a regression the old flat tier could not produce: across all 236 items
in the live profile, 230 map to cardtype 1 and 6 to cardtype 6, and NOT ONE would pay
0 coins. Table reproduces at 141 rows and the worked example lands exactly.
ZERO WIRE CHANGE, FUT_DISCARD_TABLE default off. Nothing new is sent; only the coin
figure the server credits moves. This is the patch worth defaulting on after one
in-game check, which is simply quick-selling a card and seeing the coins paid match
the value the card was already displaying.
THE GROUPING BUG IS NOT IN CARDSDLL, and the fix ranked first would have wasted a
launch. Live in the running client all three display groups own exactly the right
pack, there is exactly one copy of each pack record in 4 GiB, and nothing we send is
mis-parsed. The parsed model is correct and the Scaleform layer picks the wrong pack
when turning a tile click into a category id. displayGroupAssetId is served as 1/5/6
while the screen's category field reads 3, and group tiles carry a hardcoded
CATEGORY_ID of 0. Confirmed by direct read: ordinal 3, assetId 6, i.e. Premium, while
the last click was Gold.
The heap map that made this possible, all scoped to one pid: display-group vector
control block, 3 elements of 0x108; group record fields at +0x00 sortPriority,
+0x04 displayGroupAssetId, +0x40 a one-element pack vector; inner pack record 0x1a8
with packType at +0x38, ids at +0x70/+0xac, price at +0xa0, quantities at +0xc0..+0xd0.
extPrice SHOULD BE DELETED, not corrected. Both sub-parsers read only
externalPriceId; amount and currency are discarded. Sending the key at all creates an
"mtx" currency row that switches on a real-money price line the client can never fill
offline, which is the literal "or %1s" on every tile.
A WORRY NOBODY HAD RAISED, and I confirmed it from our own logs: the client has sent
packId 6 on every purchase it has ever made, four for four tonight and six for six
across history. We have never observed a successful buy of anything but Premium Gold.
Also settled: FUT_STORE_DISPLAYGROUP=0 is the right resting state, argued from
mechanism rather than from history; FUT_USERINFO=packs stays off because the
unopened-pack counter is client-mutable and the flag ladder silently drops squadList;
POST /user is a latent hard freeze that has never fired because the client never
issues that POST.
Honest coverage: the ActionScript layer is unread by everyone and every remaining
store mystery lives there.
Live: 439 contract checks pass, market suite passes, both flags off.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
150 lines
5.8 KiB
Python
150 lines
5.8 KiB
Python
"""D3 store-price q1.
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HYPOTHESES
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H1 extPrice.finalPrice (0x180139070) / originalPrice (0x18013aae0) read ONLY atom
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0x11a (externalPriceId). Atoms 0x1b (amount) and 0xc4 (currency) are SKIPped.
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H2 The real-money price line is rendered from the Origin/Dime commerce catalog
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singleton FUN_1801a0040 -> DAT_1802ef5a0, looked up by externalPriceId, inside
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FUN_18002cc90, which early-returns when vm+0x6c == -1.
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H3 The pack->viewmodel adapter FUN_18002c3c0 recognises exactly three currency
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name literals: "mtx", "coins", "points".
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H4 pack record +0x78 (externalPriceId sink) is constructed to -1.
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CONTROL for the absence check (H1): the SAME syntactic form. I enumerate EVERY
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scalar operand of EVERY instruction in each function, so ==, !=, switch tables and
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sub/dec ladders are all covered by construction. The positive control is that the
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scan MUST find 0x11a in both functions and MUST find 0x124/0x134/0x1d0 in the
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sibling currency-element parser FUN_180138bd0, which is known to read them.
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"""
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import traceback, sys
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OUT = "/tmp/claude-1000/-home-alex-Documents-OpenFUT/8e521ca1-ca3e-4138-bb96-df1744dd1d30/scratchpad/store"
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try:
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w = open(OUT + "/q1_raw.txt", "w")
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def p(*a):
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s = " ".join(str(x) for x in a)
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print(s)
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w.write(s + "\n")
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# ---------- 1. instruction-level scalar census (absence check) ----------
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from ghidra.program.model.lang import OperandType
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def scalars(entry):
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f = func(entry)
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body = f.getBody()
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out = {}
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it = listing.getInstructions(body, True)
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n = 0
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while it.hasNext():
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ins = it.next()
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n += 1
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for i in range(ins.getNumOperands()):
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for o in ins.getOpObjects(i):
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try:
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v = int(o.getValue())
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except Exception:
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continue
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out.setdefault(v & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF, []).append(
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(int(ins.getAddress().getOffset()), str(ins.getMnemonicString())))
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return n, out
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p("=" * 70)
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p("H1 SCALAR CENSUS -- every immediate/scalar operand in the function body")
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for name, ent in [("finalPrice FUN_180139070", 0x180139070),
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("originalPrice FUN_18013aae0", 0x18013aae0),
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("CONTROL currencyElem FUN_180138bd0", 0x180138bd0)]:
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n, sc = scalars(ent)
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p("")
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p("--- %s : %d instructions, %d distinct scalars" % (name, n, len(sc)))
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for atom, label in [(0x11a, "externalPriceId"), (0x1b, "amount"),
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(0xc4, "currency"), (0x124, "finalFunds"),
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(0x134, "funds"), (0x1d0, "name"), (0xa, "active")]:
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hits = sc.get(atom, [])
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p(" atom %-6s %-16s : %s" % (hex(atom), label,
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("ABSENT" if not hits else ", ".join("%x %s" % h for h in hits))))
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# any indirect jump (jump table) would break the census -> report
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f = func(ent)
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it = listing.getInstructions(f.getBody(), True)
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ind = []
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while it.hasNext():
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ins = it.next()
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if ins.getFlowType().isJump() and ins.getFlowType().isComputed():
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ind.append(hex(int(ins.getAddress().getOffset())))
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p(" computed/indirect jumps in body: %s" % (ind or "NONE"))
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# full sorted scalar list, so nothing is hidden
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p(" all scalars: %s" % sorted(hex(k) for k in sc))
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# ---------- 2. who consumes the viewmodel ----------
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p("")
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p("=" * 70)
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p("H3 callers of the pack->viewmodel adapter FUN_18002c3c0")
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for frm, typ, fn, ent in xrefs_to(0x18002c3c0):
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p(" %-12x %-10s %s @ %x" % (frm, typ, fn, ent))
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p("")
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p("H2 callers of the price formatter FUN_18002cc90")
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for frm, typ, fn, ent in xrefs_to(0x18002cc90):
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p(" %-12x %-10s %s @ %x" % (frm, typ, fn, ent))
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# ---------- 3. the mtx sibling FUN_18002e680 ----------
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p("")
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p("=" * 70)
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p("other 'mtx' consumer FUN_18002e680")
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src = dec(0x18002e680)
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p("len(src) = %d (printed IN FULL below)" % len(src))
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p(src)
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# ---------- 4. commerce singleton ----------
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p("")
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p("=" * 70)
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p("H2 DAT_1802ef5a0 (returned by FUN_1801a0040) xrefs")
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for frm, typ, fn, ent in xrefs_to(0x1802ef5a0):
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p(" %-12x %-10s %s @ %x" % (frm, typ, fn, ent))
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p(" live qword value in the STATIC image: %#x" % qword(0x1802ef5a0))
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p("")
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p("callers of FUN_1801a0040 (commerce getter)")
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cs = xrefs_to(0x1801a0040)
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p(" count=%d" % len(cs))
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for frm, typ, fn, ent in cs[:60]:
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p(" %-12x %-10s %s @ %x" % (frm, typ, fn, ent))
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# ---------- 5. the points gate ----------
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p("")
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p("=" * 70)
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p("H3 points gate DAT_1802de0d0 xrefs")
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for frm, typ, fn, ent in xrefs_to(0x1802de0d0):
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p(" %-12x %-10s %s @ %x" % (frm, typ, fn, ent))
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# ---------- 6. pack record ctor ----------
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p("")
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p("=" * 70)
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p("H4 pack record ctor FUN_1801342d0")
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src = dec(0x1801342d0)
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p("len(src) = %d (FULL)" % len(src))
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p(src)
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# ---------- 7. currency-name literals census ----------
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p("")
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p("=" * 70)
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p("every xref to the 'mtx' / 'coins' / 'points' / 'DRAFT_TOKEN' literals")
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for lit in [b"mtx\x00", b"coins\x00", b"points\x00", b"DRAFT_TOKEN\x00",
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b"POINTS\x00", b"FIFA_POINTS\x00", b"MTX\x00"]:
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hits = find_all(lit)
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p("")
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p(" literal %-14s occurrences=%d %s" % (lit, len(hits), [hex(h) for h in hits[:8]]))
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for h in hits[:8]:
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xs = xrefs_to(h)
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for frm, typ, fn, ent in xs[:20]:
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p(" %#x <- %-12x %-8s %s @ %x" % (h, frm, typ, fn, ent))
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w.close()
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except Exception:
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traceback.print_exc()
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try:
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w.write(traceback.format_exc())
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w.close()
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except Exception:
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pass
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