funman300
21a81ad63c
Multi-agent pass over the store subsystem, 11 agents, findings run through three
adversarial verifiers. Full writeup in docs/plan-2026-08-05-store-subsystem.md.
THE REAL DISCARD TABLE IS RECOVERED. quick_sell() paid an invented rating tier
(600/300/150/50) that was wrong for every single card. The real table is
fcc_discardcoins in the client's own game DB, 141 rows keyed (cardtype, level, rare),
read out of the running client and verified 22/22 against live items:
value = round_half_up(rating * price / 100)
level = 3 if rating >= 75, 2 if 65..74, else 1 (0x180141e8a..0x180141ea3,
derived from rating, NOT a wire field)
cardtype = FUN_1800d8330(cardsubtypeid), decoded from its jump table and checked
across every subtype 0..599 with zero disagreements
A 94-rated gold rare is 752, not 600. A 76 rare is 608, not 150. A 55 bronze is 17,
not 50.
This also closes a disagreement nobody had noticed: the CLIENT already computes and
displays the correct value locally whenever our discardValue (atom 0xd7) is 0 or
absent. FUN_18013fe00 stores our value at item +0x38 and the guard at 0x180141025
skips the local computation when it is non-zero. So the screen has been showing the
real number while the server paid a made-up one, on every quick sell ever made.
Verified beyond what the report claimed, because a missing table row pays ZERO and
that would be a regression the old flat tier could not produce: across all 236 items
in the live profile, 230 map to cardtype 1 and 6 to cardtype 6, and NOT ONE would pay
0 coins. Table reproduces at 141 rows and the worked example lands exactly.
ZERO WIRE CHANGE, FUT_DISCARD_TABLE default off. Nothing new is sent; only the coin
figure the server credits moves. This is the patch worth defaulting on after one
in-game check, which is simply quick-selling a card and seeing the coins paid match
the value the card was already displaying.
THE GROUPING BUG IS NOT IN CARDSDLL, and the fix ranked first would have wasted a
launch. Live in the running client all three display groups own exactly the right
pack, there is exactly one copy of each pack record in 4 GiB, and nothing we send is
mis-parsed. The parsed model is correct and the Scaleform layer picks the wrong pack
when turning a tile click into a category id. displayGroupAssetId is served as 1/5/6
while the screen's category field reads 3, and group tiles carry a hardcoded
CATEGORY_ID of 0. Confirmed by direct read: ordinal 3, assetId 6, i.e. Premium, while
the last click was Gold.
The heap map that made this possible, all scoped to one pid: display-group vector
control block, 3 elements of 0x108; group record fields at +0x00 sortPriority,
+0x04 displayGroupAssetId, +0x40 a one-element pack vector; inner pack record 0x1a8
with packType at +0x38, ids at +0x70/+0xac, price at +0xa0, quantities at +0xc0..+0xd0.
extPrice SHOULD BE DELETED, not corrected. Both sub-parsers read only
externalPriceId; amount and currency are discarded. Sending the key at all creates an
"mtx" currency row that switches on a real-money price line the client can never fill
offline, which is the literal "or %1s" on every tile.
A WORRY NOBODY HAD RAISED, and I confirmed it from our own logs: the client has sent
packId 6 on every purchase it has ever made, four for four tonight and six for six
across history. We have never observed a successful buy of anything but Premium Gold.
Also settled: FUT_STORE_DISPLAYGROUP=0 is the right resting state, argued from
mechanism rather than from history; FUT_USERINFO=packs stays off because the
unopened-pack counter is client-mutable and the flag ladder silently drops squadList;
POST /user is a latent hard freeze that has never fired because the client never
issues that POST.
Honest coverage: the ActionScript layer is unread by everyone and every remaining
store mystery lives there.
Live: 439 contract checks pass, market suite passes, both flags off.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
49 lines
2.1 KiB
Python
49 lines
2.1 KiB
Python
"""DIMENSION 4, pass 17: close the last gap in the reader census.
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Passes 5/6 required the item pointer to be loaded from memory (node+0x10) before
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the +0x10 access. A plain getter `return *(longlong *)(param_1 + 0x10);` would
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be MISSED by that matcher, so an absence claim is not yet safe. This pass finds
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every qword read at +0x10 off a FUNCTION PARAMETER, in every function, and lists
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the small ones (getters).
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CONTROL: the matcher is verified by requiring it to find 0x18011cca0 (the item
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registration, which reads *(param_3 + 8)) -- no; that is +8. Instead the control
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is FUN_1801a7180, found in pass 6, whose body is
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`return *(longlong *)(lVar1 + 0x10) == 0;` -- a parameter-derived +0x10 read.
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It is listed below so the reader can see the matcher firing on a known case.
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"""
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import re, traceback, time
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OUT = "/tmp/claude-1000/-home-alex-Documents-OpenFUT/8e521ca1-ca3e-4138-bb96-df1744dd1d30/scratchpad/store/dup17_out.txt"
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P = re.compile(r"\*\((?:longlong|undefined8|ulonglong|int|uint) \*\)\((?:param_\d+|this) \+ 0x10\)")
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try:
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fh = open(OUT, "w"); t0 = time.time()
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fns = []
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it = fm.getFunctions(True)
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while it.hasNext():
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fns.append(it.next())
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hits = []
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for f in fns:
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ent = int(f.getEntryPoint().getOffset())
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try:
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s = dec(ent, timeout=25)
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except Exception:
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continue
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if s.startswith("// decompile"):
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continue
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ls = [l.strip() for l in s.split("\n") if P.search(l)]
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if ls:
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hits.append((ent, f.getName(), len(s), ls))
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fh.write("swept %d functions in %.0fs; %d contain a +0x10 read off a parameter\n"
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% (len(fns), time.time() - t0, len(hits)))
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fh.write("\n--- SMALL functions (len(src) < 1500), i.e. plausible getters ---\n")
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for ent, nm, n, ls in hits:
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if n < 1500:
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fh.write(" %#x %s len=%d\n" % (ent, nm, n))
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for l in ls[:4]:
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fh.write(" %s\n" % l[:140])
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fh.write("\n--- all %d, addresses only ---\n" % len(hits))
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fh.write(" ".join("%#x" % e for e, _, _, _ in hits) + "\n")
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fh.close(); print("WROTE", OUT)
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except Exception:
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traceback.print_exc()
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