funman300
21a81ad63c
Multi-agent pass over the store subsystem, 11 agents, findings run through three
adversarial verifiers. Full writeup in docs/plan-2026-08-05-store-subsystem.md.
THE REAL DISCARD TABLE IS RECOVERED. quick_sell() paid an invented rating tier
(600/300/150/50) that was wrong for every single card. The real table is
fcc_discardcoins in the client's own game DB, 141 rows keyed (cardtype, level, rare),
read out of the running client and verified 22/22 against live items:
value = round_half_up(rating * price / 100)
level = 3 if rating >= 75, 2 if 65..74, else 1 (0x180141e8a..0x180141ea3,
derived from rating, NOT a wire field)
cardtype = FUN_1800d8330(cardsubtypeid), decoded from its jump table and checked
across every subtype 0..599 with zero disagreements
A 94-rated gold rare is 752, not 600. A 76 rare is 608, not 150. A 55 bronze is 17,
not 50.
This also closes a disagreement nobody had noticed: the CLIENT already computes and
displays the correct value locally whenever our discardValue (atom 0xd7) is 0 or
absent. FUN_18013fe00 stores our value at item +0x38 and the guard at 0x180141025
skips the local computation when it is non-zero. So the screen has been showing the
real number while the server paid a made-up one, on every quick sell ever made.
Verified beyond what the report claimed, because a missing table row pays ZERO and
that would be a regression the old flat tier could not produce: across all 236 items
in the live profile, 230 map to cardtype 1 and 6 to cardtype 6, and NOT ONE would pay
0 coins. Table reproduces at 141 rows and the worked example lands exactly.
ZERO WIRE CHANGE, FUT_DISCARD_TABLE default off. Nothing new is sent; only the coin
figure the server credits moves. This is the patch worth defaulting on after one
in-game check, which is simply quick-selling a card and seeing the coins paid match
the value the card was already displaying.
THE GROUPING BUG IS NOT IN CARDSDLL, and the fix ranked first would have wasted a
launch. Live in the running client all three display groups own exactly the right
pack, there is exactly one copy of each pack record in 4 GiB, and nothing we send is
mis-parsed. The parsed model is correct and the Scaleform layer picks the wrong pack
when turning a tile click into a category id. displayGroupAssetId is served as 1/5/6
while the screen's category field reads 3, and group tiles carry a hardcoded
CATEGORY_ID of 0. Confirmed by direct read: ordinal 3, assetId 6, i.e. Premium, while
the last click was Gold.
The heap map that made this possible, all scoped to one pid: display-group vector
control block, 3 elements of 0x108; group record fields at +0x00 sortPriority,
+0x04 displayGroupAssetId, +0x40 a one-element pack vector; inner pack record 0x1a8
with packType at +0x38, ids at +0x70/+0xac, price at +0xa0, quantities at +0xc0..+0xd0.
extPrice SHOULD BE DELETED, not corrected. Both sub-parsers read only
externalPriceId; amount and currency are discarded. Sending the key at all creates an
"mtx" currency row that switches on a real-money price line the client can never fill
offline, which is the literal "or %1s" on every tile.
A WORRY NOBODY HAD RAISED, and I confirmed it from our own logs: the client has sent
packId 6 on every purchase it has ever made, four for four tonight and six for six
across history. We have never observed a successful buy of anything but Premium Gold.
Also settled: FUT_STORE_DISPLAYGROUP=0 is the right resting state, argued from
mechanism rather than from history; FUT_USERINFO=packs stays off because the
unopened-pack counter is client-mutable and the flag ladder silently drops squadList;
POST /user is a latent hard freeze that has never fired because the client never
issues that POST.
Honest coverage: the ActionScript layer is unread by everyone and every remaining
store mystery lives there.
Live: 439 contract checks pass, market suite passes, both flags off.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
63 lines
2.5 KiB
Python
63 lines
2.5 KiB
Python
"""DIMENSION 4 (duplicates), pass 2: who READS the duplicate field.
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ESTABLISHED IN PASS 1: all four consumers of the 0x20-byte duplicate record
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(0x180162880 CreatePack, 0x18013e7f0 IS-list, 0x18013bd40, 0x1801293d0) do the
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identical fixup: for each record, scan the just-parsed item list, and where
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item->+0x08 == record->+0x00 (itemId), set item->+0x10 = record->+0x10
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(duplicateItemId). The record's +0x08 (itemLoans) and +0x18 (duplicateItemLoans)
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are never read by any of the four, and the record vector is a stack local freed at
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the end of each, so no other code can see it.
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HYPOTHESIS FOR THIS PASS: the UI reads item->+0x10 and surfaces it as the
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Scaleform key "HAS_DUPLICATE" (0x1801f6510) and/or the script command
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"GetCardDuplicate" (0x1801f3ad8).
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CONTROL: for each candidate reader we print the FULL decompile with len(src) and
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say FULL, and we look for BOTH `+ 0x10` load forms and the `== 0` / `!= 0` test
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forms. We also decompile a control function that references "IS_LOAN_PLAYER" but
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not HAS_DUPLICATE, to check that our reading of the data-provider idiom is right.
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"""
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import traceback
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OUT = "/tmp/claude-1000/-home-alex-Documents-OpenFUT/8e521ca1-ca3e-4138-bb96-df1744dd1d30/scratchpad/store/dup2_out.txt"
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def w(fh, s=""):
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fh.write(str(s) + "\n")
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def dump(fh, a, label):
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s = dec(a)
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w(fh, "")
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w(fh, "#" * 70)
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w(fh, "# %s %#x len(src)=%d FULL (no truncation)" % (label, a, len(s)))
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w(fh, "#" * 70)
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w(fh, s)
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try:
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fh = open(OUT, "w")
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w(fh, "A. xrefs to string literals of interest")
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for name, a in (("GetCardDuplicate", 0x1801F3AD8),
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("HAS_DUPLICATE", 0x1801F6510),
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("SwapCard", 0x18021EF58),
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("SWAPCARD", 0x18021EF68),
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("IS_LOAN_PLAYER", 0x1801F6520),
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("FUT_LOAN_MATCHES", 0x1802044F8)):
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w(fh, "-- %s @ %#x" % (name, a))
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for frm, typ, fn, ent in xrefs_to(a):
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w(fh, " %#x %s in %s @ %#x" % (frm, typ, fn, ent))
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for a, lbl in ((0x1800394C0, "GetCardDuplicate registrar/handler"),
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(0x180043880, "HAS_DUPLICATE user 1"),
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(0x180094220, "HAS_DUPLICATE user 2"),
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(0x180084720, "HAS_DUPLICATE user 3")):
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dump(fh, a, lbl)
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w(fh, "")
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w(fh, "B. CONTROL: 0x18015fa80 references IS_LOAN_PLAYER but not HAS_DUPLICATE")
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dump(fh, 0x18015FA80, "CONTROL loan-only user")
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fh.close()
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print("WROTE", OUT)
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except Exception:
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traceback.print_exc()
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