funman300
21a81ad63c
Multi-agent pass over the store subsystem, 11 agents, findings run through three
adversarial verifiers. Full writeup in docs/plan-2026-08-05-store-subsystem.md.
THE REAL DISCARD TABLE IS RECOVERED. quick_sell() paid an invented rating tier
(600/300/150/50) that was wrong for every single card. The real table is
fcc_discardcoins in the client's own game DB, 141 rows keyed (cardtype, level, rare),
read out of the running client and verified 22/22 against live items:
value = round_half_up(rating * price / 100)
level = 3 if rating >= 75, 2 if 65..74, else 1 (0x180141e8a..0x180141ea3,
derived from rating, NOT a wire field)
cardtype = FUN_1800d8330(cardsubtypeid), decoded from its jump table and checked
across every subtype 0..599 with zero disagreements
A 94-rated gold rare is 752, not 600. A 76 rare is 608, not 150. A 55 bronze is 17,
not 50.
This also closes a disagreement nobody had noticed: the CLIENT already computes and
displays the correct value locally whenever our discardValue (atom 0xd7) is 0 or
absent. FUN_18013fe00 stores our value at item +0x38 and the guard at 0x180141025
skips the local computation when it is non-zero. So the screen has been showing the
real number while the server paid a made-up one, on every quick sell ever made.
Verified beyond what the report claimed, because a missing table row pays ZERO and
that would be a regression the old flat tier could not produce: across all 236 items
in the live profile, 230 map to cardtype 1 and 6 to cardtype 6, and NOT ONE would pay
0 coins. Table reproduces at 141 rows and the worked example lands exactly.
ZERO WIRE CHANGE, FUT_DISCARD_TABLE default off. Nothing new is sent; only the coin
figure the server credits moves. This is the patch worth defaulting on after one
in-game check, which is simply quick-selling a card and seeing the coins paid match
the value the card was already displaying.
THE GROUPING BUG IS NOT IN CARDSDLL, and the fix ranked first would have wasted a
launch. Live in the running client all three display groups own exactly the right
pack, there is exactly one copy of each pack record in 4 GiB, and nothing we send is
mis-parsed. The parsed model is correct and the Scaleform layer picks the wrong pack
when turning a tile click into a category id. displayGroupAssetId is served as 1/5/6
while the screen's category field reads 3, and group tiles carry a hardcoded
CATEGORY_ID of 0. Confirmed by direct read: ordinal 3, assetId 6, i.e. Premium, while
the last click was Gold.
The heap map that made this possible, all scoped to one pid: display-group vector
control block, 3 elements of 0x108; group record fields at +0x00 sortPriority,
+0x04 displayGroupAssetId, +0x40 a one-element pack vector; inner pack record 0x1a8
with packType at +0x38, ids at +0x70/+0xac, price at +0xa0, quantities at +0xc0..+0xd0.
extPrice SHOULD BE DELETED, not corrected. Both sub-parsers read only
externalPriceId; amount and currency are discarded. Sending the key at all creates an
"mtx" currency row that switches on a real-money price line the client can never fill
offline, which is the literal "or %1s" on every tile.
A WORRY NOBODY HAD RAISED, and I confirmed it from our own logs: the client has sent
packId 6 on every purchase it has ever made, four for four tonight and six for six
across history. We have never observed a successful buy of anything but Premium Gold.
Also settled: FUT_STORE_DISPLAYGROUP=0 is the right resting state, argued from
mechanism rather than from history; FUT_USERINFO=packs stays off because the
unopened-pack counter is client-mutable and the flag ladder silently drops squadList;
POST /user is a latent hard freeze that has never fired because the client never
issues that POST.
Honest coverage: the ActionScript layer is unread by everyone and every remaining
store mystery lives there.
Live: 439 contract checks pass, market suite passes, both flags off.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
45 lines
2.1 KiB
Python
45 lines
2.1 KiB
Python
"""ADVERSARIAL VERIFY BATCH 5 -- attacking dim5 claim 5.
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dim5 claim 5: "model+0x20950 ... is read only through model vtable slot 0x4d8
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(accessor 0x18011c200). Its THREE consumers render a notification badge
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(FUN_1800b1d00), a tab counter (FUN_1800aeb90), and a flow-state selector
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(FUN_1800af3a0). No HTTP request is originated on any of those paths."
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My independent objdump census of `call QWORD PTR [reg+0x4d8]` over the whole PE
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found NINE sites, and of `call [reg+0x4e0]` (the SETTER) found SIX:
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0x4d8: 1800160c0 180019816 18007136b 18007e498 1800ad460 1800aeccf 1800aece6
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1800af449 1800b1d48
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0x4e0: 1800173d1 180019861 18007137b 1800ad498 1800bcb71 18013f222
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Three of the 0x4d8 sites are immediately followed by a 0x4e0 site in the same
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function -- a read-modify-WRITE of the counter that dim5 did not mention.
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Resolve every containing function, and decompile the ones dim5 never examined.
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CONTROL: 0x18013f222 must resolve to the userInfo deser 0x18013ec10 and 0x1800173d1
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to FUN_180017390 -- the two sites dim5 DID identify. Same method for all nine.
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"""
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import traceback
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try:
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S48 = [0x1800160c0, 0x180019816, 0x18007136b, 0x18007e498, 0x1800ad460,
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0x1800aeccf, 0x1800aece6, 0x1800af449, 0x1800b1d48]
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S4E = [0x1800173d1, 0x180019861, 0x18007137b, 0x1800ad498, 0x1800bcb71, 0x18013f222]
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print("=== containing functions ===")
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news = []
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for tag, lst in (("GET +0x4d8", S48), ("SET +0x4e0", S4E)):
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for a in lst:
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f = func(a)
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e = int(f.getEntryPoint().getOffset()) if f else 0
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print(" %s %#x -> %s @ %#x" % (tag, a, f.getName() if f else "NONE", e))
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if e and e not in news:
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news.append(e)
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KNOWN = {0x1800b1d00, 0x1800aeb90, 0x1800af3a0, 0x180017390, 0x18013ec10}
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todo = [e for e in news if e not in KNOWN]
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print("\nfunctions dim5 never examined: %s" % ", ".join("%#x" % e for e in todo))
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for e in todo:
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s = dec(e)
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print("=" * 100)
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print("### DECOMPILE %#x len=%d" % (e, len(s)))
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print("=" * 100)
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print(s)
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print("### END %#x len=%d PRINTED IN FULL" % (e, len(s)))
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except Exception:
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traceback.print_exc()
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