funman300
21a81ad63c
Multi-agent pass over the store subsystem, 11 agents, findings run through three
adversarial verifiers. Full writeup in docs/plan-2026-08-05-store-subsystem.md.
THE REAL DISCARD TABLE IS RECOVERED. quick_sell() paid an invented rating tier
(600/300/150/50) that was wrong for every single card. The real table is
fcc_discardcoins in the client's own game DB, 141 rows keyed (cardtype, level, rare),
read out of the running client and verified 22/22 against live items:
value = round_half_up(rating * price / 100)
level = 3 if rating >= 75, 2 if 65..74, else 1 (0x180141e8a..0x180141ea3,
derived from rating, NOT a wire field)
cardtype = FUN_1800d8330(cardsubtypeid), decoded from its jump table and checked
across every subtype 0..599 with zero disagreements
A 94-rated gold rare is 752, not 600. A 76 rare is 608, not 150. A 55 bronze is 17,
not 50.
This also closes a disagreement nobody had noticed: the CLIENT already computes and
displays the correct value locally whenever our discardValue (atom 0xd7) is 0 or
absent. FUN_18013fe00 stores our value at item +0x38 and the guard at 0x180141025
skips the local computation when it is non-zero. So the screen has been showing the
real number while the server paid a made-up one, on every quick sell ever made.
Verified beyond what the report claimed, because a missing table row pays ZERO and
that would be a regression the old flat tier could not produce: across all 236 items
in the live profile, 230 map to cardtype 1 and 6 to cardtype 6, and NOT ONE would pay
0 coins. Table reproduces at 141 rows and the worked example lands exactly.
ZERO WIRE CHANGE, FUT_DISCARD_TABLE default off. Nothing new is sent; only the coin
figure the server credits moves. This is the patch worth defaulting on after one
in-game check, which is simply quick-selling a card and seeing the coins paid match
the value the card was already displaying.
THE GROUPING BUG IS NOT IN CARDSDLL, and the fix ranked first would have wasted a
launch. Live in the running client all three display groups own exactly the right
pack, there is exactly one copy of each pack record in 4 GiB, and nothing we send is
mis-parsed. The parsed model is correct and the Scaleform layer picks the wrong pack
when turning a tile click into a category id. displayGroupAssetId is served as 1/5/6
while the screen's category field reads 3, and group tiles carry a hardcoded
CATEGORY_ID of 0. Confirmed by direct read: ordinal 3, assetId 6, i.e. Premium, while
the last click was Gold.
The heap map that made this possible, all scoped to one pid: display-group vector
control block, 3 elements of 0x108; group record fields at +0x00 sortPriority,
+0x04 displayGroupAssetId, +0x40 a one-element pack vector; inner pack record 0x1a8
with packType at +0x38, ids at +0x70/+0xac, price at +0xa0, quantities at +0xc0..+0xd0.
extPrice SHOULD BE DELETED, not corrected. Both sub-parsers read only
externalPriceId; amount and currency are discarded. Sending the key at all creates an
"mtx" currency row that switches on a real-money price line the client can never fill
offline, which is the literal "or %1s" on every tile.
A WORRY NOBODY HAD RAISED, and I confirmed it from our own logs: the client has sent
packId 6 on every purchase it has ever made, four for four tonight and six for six
across history. We have never observed a successful buy of anything but Premium Gold.
Also settled: FUT_STORE_DISPLAYGROUP=0 is the right resting state, argued from
mechanism rather than from history; FUT_USERINFO=packs stays off because the
unopened-pack counter is client-mutable and the flag ladder silently drops squadList;
POST /user is a latent hard freeze that has never fired because the client never
issues that POST.
Honest coverage: the ActionScript layer is unread by everyone and every remaining
store mystery lives there.
Live: 439 contract checks pass, market suite passes, both flags off.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
51 lines
2.6 KiB
Python
51 lines
2.6 KiB
Python
"""ADVERSARIAL VERIFY BATCH 4.
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T1 dim4 claim 4: exactly six HAS_DUPLICATE code sites; five publish (item+0x10 != 0),
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one hardcodes 0. My independent objdump census found SIX sites:
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0x1800439e4, 0x18008481d (direct lea on literal 0x1801f6510)
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0x1800943ce, 0x180094c24, 0x18009661c, 0x180097400 (via ptr slot 0x1802a1ff8)
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Note 0x18009bc40 is NOT among them, yet the claim lists FUN_18009bc40 as a
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HAS_DUPLICATE publisher. Resolve containing functions and settle it.
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T2 dim4 claim 5: FUN_180127cc0 pile serializer -- record+0x08 switch 5/6/else,
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atoms 0x16b/0x15c/0x226/0x2fe/0x331/0x330/0x262/0x87. Ladder + full decompile.
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T3 dim5 claim 5: the three claimed consumers of model vt+0x4d8 (0x18011c200).
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Enumerate ALL xrefs to 0x18011c200 and to the accessor address, and list callers.
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T4 dim5 claim 6 ATTACK: who writes model+0x5a38's begin/end? dim5 says unknown and
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guesses starterPack. Enumerate callers of the vt+0x160 accessor 0x18011b780 and
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check whether the CreatePack/purchased deserializers push into it.
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"""
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import traceback
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try:
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print("=== T1 containing functions of the six HAS_DUPLICATE sites ===")
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for a in (0x1800439e4, 0x18008481d, 0x1800943ce, 0x180094c24, 0x18009661c, 0x180097400):
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f = func(a)
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print(" %#x -> %s @ %#x" % (a, f.getName() if f else "NONE",
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int(f.getEntryPoint().getOffset()) if f else 0))
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f = func(0x18009bc40)
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print(" FUN_18009bc40 body = %s" % (f.getBody() if f else None))
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print(" any HAS_DUPLICATE site inside FUN_18009bc40? ",
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any(f.getBody().contains(addr(a)) for a in
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(0x1800439e4, 0x18008481d, 0x1800943ce, 0x180094c24, 0x18009661c, 0x180097400)))
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print()
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print("=== T3 xrefs to the vt+0x4d8 accessor 0x18011c200 (count getter) ===")
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for frm, typ, fn, ent in xrefs_to(0x18011c200):
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print(" from %#x %s in %s @ %#x" % (frm, typ, fn, ent))
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print("=== T4 xrefs to the vt+0x160 accessor 0x18011b780 (claim vector) ===")
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xs = xrefs_to(0x18011b780)
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print(" total xrefs: %d" % len(xs))
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for frm, typ, fn, ent in xs:
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print(" from %#x %s in %s @ %#x" % (frm, typ, fn, ent))
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print()
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for a, t in [(0x180127cc0, "T2 pile/itemData request serializer"),
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(0x18013bd40, "shared purchased/massinfo body (does it push into vt+0x160?)")]:
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s = dec(a)
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print("=" * 100)
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print("### DECOMPILE %s %#x len=%d" % (t, a, len(s)))
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print("=" * 100)
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print(s)
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print("### END %#x len=%d PRINTED IN FULL" % (a, len(s)))
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except Exception:
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traceback.print_exc()
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