funman300
21a81ad63c
Multi-agent pass over the store subsystem, 11 agents, findings run through three
adversarial verifiers. Full writeup in docs/plan-2026-08-05-store-subsystem.md.
THE REAL DISCARD TABLE IS RECOVERED. quick_sell() paid an invented rating tier
(600/300/150/50) that was wrong for every single card. The real table is
fcc_discardcoins in the client's own game DB, 141 rows keyed (cardtype, level, rare),
read out of the running client and verified 22/22 against live items:
value = round_half_up(rating * price / 100)
level = 3 if rating >= 75, 2 if 65..74, else 1 (0x180141e8a..0x180141ea3,
derived from rating, NOT a wire field)
cardtype = FUN_1800d8330(cardsubtypeid), decoded from its jump table and checked
across every subtype 0..599 with zero disagreements
A 94-rated gold rare is 752, not 600. A 76 rare is 608, not 150. A 55 bronze is 17,
not 50.
This also closes a disagreement nobody had noticed: the CLIENT already computes and
displays the correct value locally whenever our discardValue (atom 0xd7) is 0 or
absent. FUN_18013fe00 stores our value at item +0x38 and the guard at 0x180141025
skips the local computation when it is non-zero. So the screen has been showing the
real number while the server paid a made-up one, on every quick sell ever made.
Verified beyond what the report claimed, because a missing table row pays ZERO and
that would be a regression the old flat tier could not produce: across all 236 items
in the live profile, 230 map to cardtype 1 and 6 to cardtype 6, and NOT ONE would pay
0 coins. Table reproduces at 141 rows and the worked example lands exactly.
ZERO WIRE CHANGE, FUT_DISCARD_TABLE default off. Nothing new is sent; only the coin
figure the server credits moves. This is the patch worth defaulting on after one
in-game check, which is simply quick-selling a card and seeing the coins paid match
the value the card was already displaying.
THE GROUPING BUG IS NOT IN CARDSDLL, and the fix ranked first would have wasted a
launch. Live in the running client all three display groups own exactly the right
pack, there is exactly one copy of each pack record in 4 GiB, and nothing we send is
mis-parsed. The parsed model is correct and the Scaleform layer picks the wrong pack
when turning a tile click into a category id. displayGroupAssetId is served as 1/5/6
while the screen's category field reads 3, and group tiles carry a hardcoded
CATEGORY_ID of 0. Confirmed by direct read: ordinal 3, assetId 6, i.e. Premium, while
the last click was Gold.
The heap map that made this possible, all scoped to one pid: display-group vector
control block, 3 elements of 0x108; group record fields at +0x00 sortPriority,
+0x04 displayGroupAssetId, +0x40 a one-element pack vector; inner pack record 0x1a8
with packType at +0x38, ids at +0x70/+0xac, price at +0xa0, quantities at +0xc0..+0xd0.
extPrice SHOULD BE DELETED, not corrected. Both sub-parsers read only
externalPriceId; amount and currency are discarded. Sending the key at all creates an
"mtx" currency row that switches on a real-money price line the client can never fill
offline, which is the literal "or %1s" on every tile.
A WORRY NOBODY HAD RAISED, and I confirmed it from our own logs: the client has sent
packId 6 on every purchase it has ever made, four for four tonight and six for six
across history. We have never observed a successful buy of anything but Premium Gold.
Also settled: FUT_STORE_DISPLAYGROUP=0 is the right resting state, argued from
mechanism rather than from history; FUT_USERINFO=packs stays off because the
unopened-pack counter is client-mutable and the flag ladder silently drops squadList;
POST /user is a latent hard freeze that has never fired because the client never
issues that POST.
Honest coverage: the ActionScript layer is unread by everyone and every remaining
store mystery lives there.
Live: 439 contract checks pass, market suite passes, both flags off.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
46 lines
1.9 KiB
Python
46 lines
1.9 KiB
Python
"""DIMENSION 5 pass 3: the unopenedPacks consumer, and the tokenizer's EOF behaviour.
|
|
|
|
Resolved LIVE (read-only probe, pid 134663): model singleton = *DAT_1802e6398,
|
|
its vtable = static 0x18021c2a0, and
|
|
slot 0x4e0 -> 0x18011e120 <- the unopenedPacks(0x35e) consumer
|
|
slot 0x480 -> 0x18011baf0 <- CONTROL, the squadList(0x2d4) consumer, which is
|
|
live-confirmed working (MY SQUADS renders)
|
|
Both land inside CardsDLL, so both are analysable. If 0x18011baf0 does not look like
|
|
a squad-roster accessor, the vtable resolution is wrong and 0x4e0 means nothing.
|
|
|
|
HYPOTHESES
|
|
H1 0x18011e120 stores the pack count into a model field; xrefs to that field give
|
|
the UI consumer.
|
|
H2 the tokenizer 0x1801c7f10 returns a specific token at end of input; that value
|
|
decides whether a trailing re-dispatch terminates or spins (the 0x1801c7f1a
|
|
freeze).
|
|
"""
|
|
import traceback, os
|
|
|
|
OUT = "/tmp/claude-1000/-home-alex-Documents-OpenFUT/8e521ca1-ca3e-4138-bb96-df1744dd1d30/scratchpad/store"
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
for name, a in [
|
|
("consumer_18011e120", 0x18011e120),
|
|
("control_18011baf0", 0x18011baf0),
|
|
("nexttok_1801c7f10", 0x1801c7f10),
|
|
]:
|
|
src = dec(a, 300)
|
|
open(os.path.join(OUT, "dec_%s.c" % name), "w").write(src)
|
|
print("\n#### %s @ %#x len=%d\n%s" % (name, a, len(src), src if len(src) < 6000 else "(see file)"))
|
|
|
|
print("\n---- asm of 0x18011e120 ----")
|
|
f = func(0x18011e120)
|
|
it = listing.getInstructions(f.getBody(), True)
|
|
while it.hasNext():
|
|
ins = it.next()
|
|
print(" %#x %s" % (int(ins.getAddress().getOffset()), str(ins)))
|
|
|
|
print("\n---- vtable static 0x18021c2a0 slots 0x470..0x500 ----")
|
|
for s in range(0x470, 0x508, 8):
|
|
t = qword(0x18021c2a0 + s)
|
|
fn = fm.getFunctionAt(addr(t)) if 0x180000000 <= t < 0x181000000 else None
|
|
print(" +%#05x -> %#x %s" % (s, t, fn.getName() if fn else ""))
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
traceback.print_exc()
|