21a81ad63c
Multi-agent pass over the store subsystem, 11 agents, findings run through three
adversarial verifiers. Full writeup in docs/plan-2026-08-05-store-subsystem.md.
THE REAL DISCARD TABLE IS RECOVERED. quick_sell() paid an invented rating tier
(600/300/150/50) that was wrong for every single card. The real table is
fcc_discardcoins in the client's own game DB, 141 rows keyed (cardtype, level, rare),
read out of the running client and verified 22/22 against live items:
value = round_half_up(rating * price / 100)
level = 3 if rating >= 75, 2 if 65..74, else 1 (0x180141e8a..0x180141ea3,
derived from rating, NOT a wire field)
cardtype = FUN_1800d8330(cardsubtypeid), decoded from its jump table and checked
across every subtype 0..599 with zero disagreements
A 94-rated gold rare is 752, not 600. A 76 rare is 608, not 150. A 55 bronze is 17,
not 50.
This also closes a disagreement nobody had noticed: the CLIENT already computes and
displays the correct value locally whenever our discardValue (atom 0xd7) is 0 or
absent. FUN_18013fe00 stores our value at item +0x38 and the guard at 0x180141025
skips the local computation when it is non-zero. So the screen has been showing the
real number while the server paid a made-up one, on every quick sell ever made.
Verified beyond what the report claimed, because a missing table row pays ZERO and
that would be a regression the old flat tier could not produce: across all 236 items
in the live profile, 230 map to cardtype 1 and 6 to cardtype 6, and NOT ONE would pay
0 coins. Table reproduces at 141 rows and the worked example lands exactly.
ZERO WIRE CHANGE, FUT_DISCARD_TABLE default off. Nothing new is sent; only the coin
figure the server credits moves. This is the patch worth defaulting on after one
in-game check, which is simply quick-selling a card and seeing the coins paid match
the value the card was already displaying.
THE GROUPING BUG IS NOT IN CARDSDLL, and the fix ranked first would have wasted a
launch. Live in the running client all three display groups own exactly the right
pack, there is exactly one copy of each pack record in 4 GiB, and nothing we send is
mis-parsed. The parsed model is correct and the Scaleform layer picks the wrong pack
when turning a tile click into a category id. displayGroupAssetId is served as 1/5/6
while the screen's category field reads 3, and group tiles carry a hardcoded
CATEGORY_ID of 0. Confirmed by direct read: ordinal 3, assetId 6, i.e. Premium, while
the last click was Gold.
The heap map that made this possible, all scoped to one pid: display-group vector
control block, 3 elements of 0x108; group record fields at +0x00 sortPriority,
+0x04 displayGroupAssetId, +0x40 a one-element pack vector; inner pack record 0x1a8
with packType at +0x38, ids at +0x70/+0xac, price at +0xa0, quantities at +0xc0..+0xd0.
extPrice SHOULD BE DELETED, not corrected. Both sub-parsers read only
externalPriceId; amount and currency are discarded. Sending the key at all creates an
"mtx" currency row that switches on a real-money price line the client can never fill
offline, which is the literal "or %1s" on every tile.
A WORRY NOBODY HAD RAISED, and I confirmed it from our own logs: the client has sent
packId 6 on every purchase it has ever made, four for four tonight and six for six
across history. We have never observed a successful buy of anything but Premium Gold.
Also settled: FUT_STORE_DISPLAYGROUP=0 is the right resting state, argued from
mechanism rather than from history; FUT_USERINFO=packs stays off because the
unopened-pack counter is client-mutable and the flag ladder silently drops squadList;
POST /user is a latent hard freeze that has never fired because the client never
issues that POST.
Honest coverage: the ActionScript layer is unread by everyone and every remaining
store mystery lives there.
Live: 439 contract checks pass, market suite passes, both flags off.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
81 lines
3.1 KiB
Python
81 lines
3.1 KiB
Python
"""DIMENSION 4 (duplicates), pass 4: the item class, and the one unresolved
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atom-serialisation site.
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Open items from pass 3:
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(a) the single UNRESOLVED FUN_180180cd0 call site, 0x1801438e2 in FUN_180143760,
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takes its atom from [RBP+0x60]. Until it is characterised, "no request ever
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serialises 0xeb/0xec/0xed/0x16f" is not airtight.
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(b) which class implements GetCardDuplicate (DAT_1802def18 vtable slot 0x18).
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(c) the item-model manager: DAT_1802e6398 is written by FUN_18011d780. Get the
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concrete vtable so slots 0x160 / 0x7d8 / 0xa08 can be named, and so the item
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constructor (which must zero item+0x10) can be found.
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CONTROL for the vtable walk: slot 0x08 of any of these vtables must decode to a
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real function in .text, and we print the raw qwords so a bogus vtable is visible.
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"""
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import traceback
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OUT = "/tmp/claude-1000/-home-alex-Documents-OpenFUT/8e521ca1-ca3e-4138-bb96-df1744dd1d30/scratchpad/store/dup4_out.txt"
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def w(fh, s=""):
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fh.write(str(s) + "\n")
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def dump(fh, a, label):
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s = dec(a)
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w(fh, "")
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w(fh, "#" * 70)
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w(fh, "# %s %#x len(src)=%d FULL" % (label, a, len(s)))
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w(fh, "#" * 70)
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w(fh, s)
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try:
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fh = open(OUT, "w")
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dump(fh, 0x180143760, "(a) dynamic-atom serialiser")
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w(fh, "")
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w(fh, "=" * 70)
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w(fh, "(b) xrefs to DAT_1802def18 (the script card-info provider pointer)")
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w(fh, "=" * 70)
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for frm, typ, fn, ent in xrefs_to(0x1802DEF18):
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w(fh, " %#x %s in %s @ %#x" % (frm, typ, fn, ent))
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dump(fh, 0x18011D780, "(c) manager singleton installer FUN_18011d780")
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w(fh, "")
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w(fh, "=" * 70)
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w(fh, "(c2) candidate manager vtables referenced from FUN_18011d780")
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w(fh, "=" * 70)
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f = func(0x18011D780)
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seen = set()
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if f is not None:
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it = listing.getInstructions(f.getBody(), True)
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while it.hasNext():
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ins = it.next()
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for r in ins.getReferencesFrom():
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t = int(r.getToAddress().getOffset())
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if 0x180000000 <= t < 0x181000000 and t not in seen:
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seen.add(t)
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try:
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q0 = qword(t)
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q1 = qword(t + 8)
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except Exception:
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continue
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f0 = fm.getFunctionAt(addr(q0)) if 0x180000000 <= q0 < 0x181000000 else None
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f1 = fm.getFunctionAt(addr(q1)) if 0x180000000 <= q1 < 0x181000000 else None
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if f0 and f1:
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w(fh, " possible vtable %#x : [0]=%#x %s [8]=%#x %s" %
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(t, q0, f0.getName(), q1, f1.getName()))
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for off in (0x160, 0x7D8, 0xA08, 0xA40, 0x5B8):
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try:
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q = qword(t + off)
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except Exception:
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continue
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ff = fm.getFunctionAt(addr(q)) if 0x180000000 <= q < 0x181000000 else None
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w(fh, " +%#05x -> %#x %s" % (off, q, ff.getName() if ff else "(not a function)"))
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fh.close()
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print("WROTE", OUT)
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except Exception:
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traceback.print_exc()
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