# Agent brief — reverse the FIFA17 OSDK_UNDERAGE_ERROR (Origin error 0xa2000012) (clean-room)

## Clean-room rule (HARD)
Derive ONLY from decrypted dumps here + live /proc/PID/mem (`pgrep -x FIFA17.exe`, live 39211) +
our LSX/Blaze logs. NEVER leaked EA source.

## Where we are (this session's WIN)
The recipient-echo fix (lsx_responder_v2.py: response `sender` must byte-equal request `recipient`)
CASCADED the whole Origin login chain. Live-confirmed NATURAL (no forging): OriginSDK(*[0x144b7c7a0])
+0x3a0/+0x3a8 = 0x1f89493 (default user set), FIFA issued GetAuthCode ×3 on its own (FIFA17PC +
FIFA17PC-SERVER), SetPresence flowing ("In Menus"). The OSDK login state machine advanced
OSDK_INVALID_USER → **OSDK_UNDERAGE_ERROR**. On screen: "not eligible to use EA's online features due
to an age restriction". Blaze login (1/0x0A) still 0 — this age gate blocks before it.

## The exact gate
OSDK classifier **0x14717d5d0** (dump osdk_classifier_14717d5d0.bin.asm): reads the OSDK/Ebisu
manager's cached "last error" and maps it:
  `cmp eax,0xa2000003 -> OSDK_INVALID_USER`   (we cleared this — user now valid)
  `cmp eax,0xa2000012 -> OSDK_UNDERAGE_ERROR`  (the CURRENT error) <-- the target
The error code comes from the manager chain: manager `*[0x144b86bf8]` = live 0x43c46c70,
vptr **0x143959168**; classifier does `mov rcx,[0x144b86bf8]; mov rax,[rcx]; call [rax+0x60]` (=
**0x14719b1b0**, dump mgr_vt60_14719b1b0.bin.asm) -> rsi (a sub-object); then `rsi->vt[0x68]()` ->
the error code = 0xa2000012.

## What is ALREADY RULED OUT (do not re-chase)
- NOT from GetProfile: the IsUnderAge bool-parse (helper 0x14713ffa0: strconv result -> `setne al`,
  so "false"->0 = not-underage) stores our IsUnderAge="false" correctly. GetProfile deserializer
  0x147136140 reads only: UserId PersonaId Persona AvatarId Country IsUnderAge IsSubscriber
  GeoCountry CommerceCountry CommerceCurrency — no DOB/age field.
- 0xa2000012 is NOT constructed by inline mov+lea/add arithmetic ANYWHERE in 0x146000000-0x1476f0000
  (scanned, 0 sites). So it is a DATA-TABLE value (scan DATA regions for the raw dword `12 00 00 a2`
  = an error-map table), or a value read from a Nucleus/HTTP/Blaze response, or a field.
- Nucleus :42131 was NOT hit this boot (no live conn) and Blaze login=0 — so the underage was cached
  by an Origin/LSX operation during boot, before Blaze/Nucleus. (Confirm; don't assume.)

## The questions to answer
1. **Which sub-object does manager->vt[0x60] (0x14719b1b0) return, and where is its error field
   (read by vt[0x68]) WRITTEN with 0xa2000012?** Find the writer = the operation that decided underage.
2. **What is 0xa2000012's source** — locate the raw dword in a data/error-map table (scan .rdata/.data
   for `12 00 00 a2`), find the code that selects it, and what INPUT maps to it (an HTTP/Nucleus status?
   a profile/account field? an entitlement? a hardcoded default when age is unverified?).
3. **What CONDITION makes FIFA underage** despite IsUnderAge="false"? Trace back from the writer to the
   input we control (an LSX verb/field we answer wrong or omit, a Blaze reply, a missing DOB, an
   entitlement/age-rating check). We own every server endpoint FIFA talks to.
4. **The fix**: concrete LSX/Blaze/Nucleus responder change (verb/field/value) that makes FIFA classify
   the user as an adult, so OSDK advances past OSDK_UNDERAGE_ERROR toward Blaze login.

## Dumps / method
osdk_classifier_14717d5d0, mgr_vt60_14719b1b0, getprofile_deser_147136140, boolparse_ffa0,
authcode_impl_1470e67f0, sdk_connect_writer, + earlier auth/connect dumps. objdump Intel, VMA==runtime VA.
Dump more live: `f.seek(va); f.read(n)` + objdump --adjust-vma. Data-dword scan: read region, `d.find(b'\x12\x00\x00\xa2')`.
Every claim needs a VA/bytes/disasm/log line. We can WRITE /proc/mem too (A/B: poke a candidate field, watch
OSDK state 0x43d189d8+0x80 [re-find via vptr 0x14395c180] leave "OSDK_UNDERAGE_ERROR").
